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CHAPTER 1 : Cross-State Water Quality Management in a Federalist Setting
1.1.

Introduction

The boundaries of surface water systems and the political entities which govern them are
frequently misaligned, leading to sub-optimal pollution policies. Escalating regulation to a
higher geographic level may alleviate inefficiencies of local governance, but can be excessively rigid or generate political backlash. This trade-off between local and federal oversight
is at the heart of the federalist debate over United States surface water regulation. The
Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 authorizes the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to set national standards with regards to surface water protection, but it also allows
the EPA to delegate implementation to the state. Despite the CWA’s longevity, this partial
decentralization remains controversial. In 2020, the Trump administration sought to narrow
the CWA’s authority over certain waterways; in 2021, the Biden administration signalled it
may reverse this policy. In response to the proposed rule change, a number of economists
highlighted that while interested parties assert the consequences (or lack thereof) of decentralization, the empirical research is insufficient to provide a definitive answer (Keiser et al.
(2021)).
In this paper, I shed light on the cost of federalist water quality management by investigating whether decentralized regulation generates negative externalities across state borders.
If state governments are primarily concerned with their own citizens’ well-being, then pollution which flows out-of-state is less costly to the regulator than pollution which primarily
remains within the state’s boundaries. I construct a model to predict that decentralization in upstream areas generates negative spillover effects in downstream states, while the
spillover effect of decentralization on border rivers is theoretically ambiguous. I consider
a case for regional oversight, wherein states may resolve inefficiencies of decentralization
through political cooperation or formalized interstate agreements. Additionally, I discuss
regional variation with regards to spillover effects.
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River systems are a crucial determinant of where populations consolidate and how political
boundaries are drawn. Therefore, a simple comparison of water quality on rivers based on
their out-of-state exposure is confounded by historical population trends, industry composition, and a multitude of geographic and economic determinants of water quality. To isolate
the effect of state regulatory choices on water quality, I leverage the federalist structure of
the Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972. The CWA sets the federal government as the default
regulator of surface water quality, but allows states to apply for authorization to conduct
CWA monitoring programs within their own boundaries. I exploit variation in timing of
state authorization to conduct a difference-in-difference analysis (Sigman (2005)). I measure
water quality using a large set of dissolved oxygen saturation readings across the United
States spanning over forty years (Keiser and Shapiro (2018)) and rely on a geospatial USGS
data set of river networks in the United States to measure river exposure to out-of-state
upstream waters.
I find evidence that state authorization reduces downstream water quality by approximately
0.09 standard deviations, and that this effect is most clearly identified in the Southeast.
Next, I turn to factors that could mitigate spillovers by promoting cooperation across jurisdiction: political alignment and compacts. I find suggestive evidence of interstate cooperation. The effect of interstate compacts is heterogeneous: the 2008 Great Lakes Compact
improved water quality up to 0.1 standard deviations, while the measurable benefits of the
2014 Chesapeake Bay Agreement are specific to a reduction in nitrates and phosphates. I
attribute these divergent results to the Great Lakes Compact’s stronger enforcement mechanisms, the Chesapeake Bay Agreement’s inclusion of marginally attached states, and the
Chesapeake Bay Agreement’s focus on watershed health. With regards to political cooperation, I find that political alignment between neighboring states corresponds to slightly
higher water quality on border rivers; I do not find a more generalized benefit of shared
political affiliation.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the place of this study among the
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related literature. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework. Section 4 discusses the
empirical strategy and data. Section 5 discusses the estimation results and robustness
checks, and Section 6 concludes.

1.2.

Literature Review

Sigman (2005) investigates cross-state spillovers in the United States using state authorization (the identification strategy used in this paper) to isolate the effect of decentralized
management on downstream neighbors and finds a 4% decline in downstream water quality
after a state receives authorization to manage its own pollution permitting program. I build
on Sigman (2005) using a much larger set of historical data which was not available at the
time of the original analysis, and am thereby able to expand the sample to approximately
eighty times as many river segments. This expansion allows me to assess spillovers on a
larger set of rivers, as well as to investigate heterogeneity of effects.
The recent expansion in accessibility of historical water quality data has been pivotal in the
development of a growing body of literature studying long-term water quality trends under
the regulatory structure of the Clean Water Act in the United States. Keiser and Shapiro
(2018) and Jerch (2021) rely on this extensive data to measure improvements in water quality under the Clean Water Act: both find high cost-to-benefit ratios of CWA-related water
treatments, and Jerch (2021) finds that mandated improvements have positive downstream
spillover effects. In addition to Sigman (2005), several other studies explicitly rely on state
authorization to identify changes in water quality, finding that the effect of a state’s authorization status on its own water quality is heterogeneous (Fowler and Birdsall (2020))
and that historically corrupt states record fewer violations after receiving authorization to
conduct their own monitoring programs (Grooms (2015)). To my knowledge, this paper is
the first to examine spillover effects using the expansive EPA STORET data.
Evidence of downstream spillovers is not unique to the United States: previous studies
provide evidence that free-riding is prevalent across international settings. Cai et al. (2016)
find 20% more industrial activity in the most downstream county of Chinese provinces after
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the imposition of pollution reduction mandates, and additionally find greater leniency of
enforcement measures in these downstream counties relative to upstream counties. Lipscomb and Mobarak (2016) exploit redrawing of county boundaries in Brazil to identify the
effect of decentralized policy on water quality, and find that levels of biochemical oxygen
demand, a pollutant, increase 1.5-3% per kilometer as a river reaches a county border.
Numerous papers evaluate transboundary water system health from a game theoretic perspective, finding that the optimal pollution regulatory structure is sensitive to a plethora
of factors, including initial pollution stock (List and Mason (2001)), ability to assign costs
(Ni & Wang, 2006), symmetry of abatement costs (Fernandez and McGarvey (2019)), and
industry composition (Evans et al. (2018)).
This paper’s second new contribution to the literature is to conduct a reduced-form evaluation of interstate compacts in the United States. Interstate compacts serve as legally
binding agreements between states to manage watershed health or water appropriation.
Fernandez and McGarvey (2019) use a dynamic game model approach to evaluate how
states achieve phosphate reduction in the Upper Potomac River Basin, while additional
studies use detailed environmental ecological models to estimate least cost pollution reduction across numerous transboundary watersheds (van der Veeren and Tol (2001); Hasler
et al. (2014)). To my knowledge, no previously papers have evaluated the efficacy of US
interstate watershed pollution compacts in improving river water quality.

1.3.

Model

In this section I build a model (adapted from Oates (2001), and Sigman (2005))1 to deliver
predictions on the effect of decentralization on a state’s water quality, as well as the quality
of surrounding waters. The model includes three agents: the state, a polluting firm, and
a representative citizen. Equilibrium pollution is the outcome of the state’s utility maximization on behalf of the citizen, capturing a trade-off between the citizen’s (increasing)
utility for consumption and (decreasing) utility for pollution. The model predicts the state’s
1

I also reference List and Mason (2001), Banzhaf and Chupp (2012), Huang et al. (2018), Hutchinson and
Kennedy (2008), and Fernandez and McGarvey (2019) in the development of this model.
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optimal choice over (1) the maximum permitted level of pollution and (2) the location at
which the firm is permitted to pollute. I first solve for the federal case and then the state
case, finding a higher pollution point under the state case.
1.3.1. Federal Case
Consider a case in which State 1 governs areas A and B in Figure 1.1. Firm 1 produces good
Y in Area A. Good Y has only one input: emissions E into River R. State 1 makes two
decisions. First, it decides the location of Firm 1’s production along River R. Let S denote
the set of possible sites. Second, State 1 decides the level of emissions it will permit at the
selected site. State 1’s objective is to maximize utility for a representative citizen, whose
utility is a function of good Y and pollution P : U (Y, P ) = u(Y ) + v(P ), where u′ (Y ) > 0,
u′′ (Y ) < 0, and v ′ (P ) < 0.
Good Y has linear production function Y = f(E) = E. Emissions at Site s produce pollution
p at downstream points i under the assumed function form psi = (γ¯s − γ s−i )Es , where γ s−i is
the distance from Site s to point i. Let γ¯s denote the point i where pollution from upstream
Site s is trivially close to zero.
The social cost of pollution is not constant across sites, and is influenced by factors including
the area’s population concentration, leisure use, and ecological significance. Let ϕi capture
location-specific mediators of pollution cost at point i, so that the cost of pollution at
point i is ϕi pi . Then the total cost of pollution caused by site s can be expressed as
Φs Es =

Pi=γ¯s
i=s

ϕi (γ¯s − γ s−i )Es . The state chooses s∗ , the site with minimum total costs per

level of emissions, as the site for Firm 1’s production.
Substituting the equations above, the citizen’s utility function can be expressed as U (Y, P ) =
u(Y ) + v(P ) = u(E) + v(Φs Es ). The state chooses E ∗ such that u′ (E) = −v ′ (ΦE). The
firm then emits E ∗ at site s∗ to produce quantity Y ∗ .
1.3.2. State Case
Now consider the case where Area B is no longer under State 1’s jurisdiction. Let xb denote
the border crossing on River R from Area A to Area B. Assume State 1’s population is
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unchanged, and good Y is only consumed by State 1’s population. Because State 1 only
optimizes across Area A, ϕi = 0 for all points downstream of xb .
Let S B be the set of sites for which γ̄ is downstream of xb . For these sites, the total cost of
pollution decreases from

Pγ̄

i=s ϕi pi

to

Pxb

i=s ϕi pi .

B
Let sB
1 ∈ S denote the lowest cost site in

SB .
The state’s optimal pollution scheme changes, relative to the baseline case, if either (1)
∗
s∗ ∈ S B or (2) ϕB
1 < ϕ . Equivalently, the state’s optimal pollution scheme changes if

either (1) site s∗ is one the sites whose social cost is now lower, or (2) the least costly
B
∗
affected site, sB
1 , has new cost ϕ1 less than that of s .

If either of these conditions holds, then the cost of the original emissions choice E ∗ decreases.
For the original optimization u′ (E) = −v ′ (ΦE) to hold, emissions (and correspondingly,
consumption of good Y ) increase. If the first condition holds, the location of pollution
does not change, but the level increases, and remains located in a downstream site in Area
A. If the second condition holds, the level of pollution increases and emissions shift to a
more downstream location. Thus, in the decentralized case, State 1 permits a higher level
of emissions than in the baseline case, and this increase occurs at sites which include the
outside jurisdiction in their downstream affected area. Thus pollution on River R in Area
B increases relative to the baseline case.
Prediction 1: Pollution increases in a downstream neighboring state if pollution in an
upstream neighboring state is regulated by that state, rather than by the federal government.
Prediction 2: The increase in downstream state pollution will be most concentrated on
river segments with greatest exposure to the upstream neighbor.
1.3.2.1. Heterogeneous State Preferences
The above state case assumes the same representative citizen utility function under the
both the federal and state case. But citizen preferences vary by state, specifically with
regards to environmental preferences. Here, I assume that the federal government chooses
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optimal pollution based on the preferences of the nationally representative citizen whereas
state governments rely on their own citizens’ preferences.
First, I abstract from the border question considered above and assume State 1 optimizes
over areas A and B. Suppose citizens of State 1 have stronger environmental preferences than
the national average, such that vState1 (E) < vN ational (E) at any given value of E. Then
∗
∗
EState1
< EN
ational , and so overall emissions in State 1 decline under state jurisdiction

relative to federal jurisdiction. The reverse is true if State 1’s citizens have weaker-thanaverage environmental preferences.
Second, I reintroduce the border issue wherein State 1 optimizes only over Area A, but
still assume vState1 (E) < vN ational (E). In this case, the effect of state jurisdiction is mixed.
If environmental preferences are strong, yielding sufficiently high ϕi in the area directly
upstream of xb , then net emissions may decrease relative to the federal case, generating
positive spillovers. Thus the effect of state jurisdiction on net emissions is ambiguous in the
case of strong state-level environmental preferences.
The effect on pollution location, however, is monotonic: the cost of some emissions level E
at sites s ∈ S B strictly decreases in the state case relative to the federal case. Pollution
therefore shifts downstream under state jurisdiction.
Prediction 3: In states with strong environmental preferences, state jurisdiction decreases
net emissions and shifts emissions downstream.
1.3.3. Interdependent States Case
Consider the scenario in which State 2, controlling Area B, is able to enter agreements
with State 1. In this scenario State 2 may exert bargaining power through some external
means, including but not limited to trade deals or other environmental agreements. State
2 may assert soft power, through avenues such as political alignment with State 1, or may
negotiate a binding contract.
In this case, State 1 assigns a new weight to pollution at sites downstream of xb , such that
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ϕstate
< ϕinterdep
≤ ϕfi ederal , where state, interdep, and f ederal reference the state, interi
i
dependent, and federal cases respectively. Then pollution at site s∗interdep ∈ S B decreases
relative to the non-negotiated state case. If negotiation is sufficiently effective, State 1 fully
internalizes the cost of downstream pollution and emissions return to the baseline federal
scenario.
Prediction 4: Interdependence between states, measured using political affiliation and implementation of interstate compacts, decreases the level of pollution decrease in the downstream state.
1.3.4. Border Rivers
In the above cases, pollution spillovers are one-directional and so State 2’s choices over
its emissions do not impact State 1’s maximization problem. In a case where States 1
and 2 share River R as a border, however, State 1 citizens’ utility depends on emissions
choices made by both states. Assume citizens in State 1 consume only in-state good Y ,
and citizens of State 2 do not consume good Y . Instead, the firm and citizens in State 2
produce and consumer some good W, symmetric to good Y. Let P1 P2 be the pollution
produces in State 1 for Good Y and State 2 for Good W respectively. State 1’s citizen
utility function is still U (Y, P ) = u(Y ) + v(P ), but P = P1 + P2 . State 1 then solves for
u′ (E1 ) = −v ′ (Φ1 E1 + Φ2 E2 ).
Consider State 1’s decision over E ∗ in the case where State 2 has increased E2 . State 1
can increase E1 to increase citizen utility from good Y , or decrease E1 to reduce citizen
harm from pollution. State 1’s optimal choice depends on the form of v(P ). If v ′′ (E) > 0,
then State 1 will decrease E1 in response to an increase in E2 . If v ′′ (E) < 0, then State 1’s
response depends on the functional forms of u() and v(): if u′′ (E ∗ ) > −v ′′ (E ∗ ) at E ∗ , then
State 1 decreases emissions in response to an increase in E2 . Otherwise, it increases E1 .
Prediction 5: The effect of state-level jurisdiction on border river water quality is ambiguous.
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1.4.

Empirical Strategy

1.4.1. Background
1.4.1.1. Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), through which regulatory bodies monitor and restrict the discharge
of enumerated pollutants into US waterways. Under NPDES, the regulator issues permits to
polluting agents and sets numerical discharge limits and technological abatement standards.
The EPA is the default regulator, but states may receive authorization to conduct their
own surface water quality monitoring and enforcement. Authorized states issue permits
and conduct monitoring and enforcement programs within their own borders. In order to
receive authorization, states must submit an attorney general’s statement, a memorandum
of agreement between the state and the EPA, and a program description. Twenty-seven
states received authorization between 1973 and 1975; to date, all but three states have
received authorization to conduct their own NPDES program. See Figure 1.3 for a summary
map of authorization year.
States are legally required to uphold federal standards as a minimum requirement for their
discharge limits. However, states have considerable discretion both in their enumerated
standards as well as the rigor of their enforcement. Previous reviews have found that numerical standards for pollutant discharge vary by orders of magnitude across states (Sigman
(2003)), and that many states gradually reduce regulatory efforts after receiving authorization (Cherney (1986)).
The EPA has the authority to rescind a state’s authorization if it is not complaint with
federal standards, but has never exercised this power. In the first ten years of the NPDES
program, the EPA focused primarily on authorizing new state programs (Cherney (1986)).
In the 1980s, it began to place more attention on reevaluating existing programs. Since 1989,
the EPA has received 49 petitions across 30 states requesting that states’ authorization be
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revoked.2 In cases in which the EPA determines that the petition has merit, it investigates
the complaint and attempts to find a solution with the state governing body. The collective
evidence conveys that states are answerable to federal regulators in the long-run, but retain
significant discretion over their permit programs.
1.4.1.2. Interstate Compacts
With federal approval, states can form interstate compacts regarding shared watersheds.
The majority of water-related compacts are among western states and focus on water apportionment. Compacts concerning shared watershed resource management and pollution
control are concentrated in the Upper Midwest and Eastern seaboard. In this analysis I
focus on two large-scale compacts: The Great Lakes Basin Compact and the Chesapeake
Bay Watershed Agreement. See Figure 1.4 for a map of the two watersheds.
The states which comprise the Great Lakes Basin (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) initially signed a compact agreement in
1968 to establish the Great Lakes Commission. The Commission has the power to conduct
analysis, prepare reports, and make recommendations to state and federal regulators. However, the 1968 compact does not provide the Commission any enforcement authority. In
2008, the states agreed to a new compact which limited diversions from the Lakes except under enumerated circumstances. States are additionally required to implement conservation
programs. For this analysis, I focus on the 2008 compact.
The Chesapeake Bay watershed has similarly experienced multiple iterations of cooperative
agreements. In 1983, the District of Columbia and the states of Virginia, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania formed the Chesapeake Bay Program Partnership to cooperatively manage
the Bay. In 2009, President Obama signed an executive order calling on the federal government to reassess and protect the waters of the Chesapeake Bay. This order led to the 2014
Chesapeake Watershed Agreement which, in addition to the original four entities, included
headwater states Delaware, New York, and West Virginia. The agreement affirms envi2

“NPDES State Program Withdrawal Petitions," US EPA.
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ronmental preservation goals, including sustainable fisheries, pollution reduction, habitat
preservation, and increased citizen stewardship. While the agreement references some enumerated pollution reduction efforts, most goals in the agreement are broad ten-year targets
with no identifiable enforcement mechanism.
1.4.2. Estimation Strategy
A “naive" approach to measuring the effect of out-of-state behavior on a river’s water
quality might create a measure of out-of-state exposure at the river segment level, and
identify spillovers as β in the equation below:

W Qi

=α+β

OOSi

+ϵit

| {z }

| {z }

Out-of-State
Exposure

Water Quality
Location i

Using a simple binary indicator for whether a river segment is downstream of a state border,
I find that β = 0.046, significant at the 1% level. This value suggests that water quality
on river segments which are downstream of a border crossing is actually 0.046 standard
deviations higher than that of segments which are not downstream on a border, suggesting
positive spillover effects from upstream neighbors.3 This result, however, ignores a myriad
of factors which correlate to both water quality and downstream status. In the Midwest,
for example, most river systems flow roughly North-to-South, and significant industrial
activity is historically concentrated in the Upper Midwest. Furthermore, state boundaries
are not independent of river systems; indeed, large rivers are often used to define borders
between states. The naive approach does not remove such sources of endogeneity, or other
unobservable or hydrographic sources, and is therefore not particularly informative.
In an ideal scenario, these sources of endogeneity would be resolved using a randomized
experiment. A large number of identical up and downstream state pairs would each be
assigned to either treatment or control. In the treatment group, upstream states conduct
3

For this back-of-the-envelope regression, I use simple OLS with robust standard errors. I trim the sample
using the sample restrictions used in the following main analysis: sample period is restricted to 1977-2020,
on segments of stream order 4 or greater, excluding segments within 800 meters of a state border.
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monitoring programs at the state level, whereas upstream states in the control group are
under federal monitoring. In both groups, downstream states would be under federal monitoring in order to isolate the effect of the upstream neighbor’s choices. Spillovers could
then be identified as Spillovers = W QDownstream,T reatment − W QDownstream,Control .
Even without political or logistical constraints, such an experiment is not physically possible:
US states vary dramatically in size and ecological conditions. A large set of comparable
pairs does not exist. Instead, to isolate the effect of state policy, I exploit variation in year
of authorization to conduct a difference-in-difference analysis of water quality before and
after authorization. I first test the effect of authorization on own-state water quality:

W Qit = α + β1 Sit + Xit + ϵit (1)

Where W Qit represents water quality on stream segment i in year t. Sit indicates whether
State S, in which segment i is located, is authorized in year t. X captures a vector of controls
for income, League of Conservation score (a proxy for environmental preferences), governor
political party affiliation (equal to 1 if governor is Democrat, and 0 otherwise), state GDP
percent agriculture, and state GDP percent manufacturing. I also include a specification
with interactions between authorization and each control. This last specification allows for
heterogeneous treatment effects based on state characteristics. In particular, the interaction
between authorization and League of Conservation (LCV) score tests the prediction that
the effect of own-state authorization is heterogeneous across environmental preferences. All
controls vary at the state-year level. All regressions throughout the analysis include segment
and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The main specification of interest, measuring downstream spillover effects, is as follows:

W Qit = α + β1 Si + β2 Uit + Xit + ϵit (2)
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Where Uit indicates whether Upstream neighbor U is authorized in year t. In (2), I subset
the sample to only segments which have an upstream neighbor (i.e. interstate rivers).
1.4.2.1. Compacts
To assess the impact of interstate compacts on water quality, I extend equation (1):

W Qit = α + β1 Sit + β2 Cit + Xit + ϵit (3)

Where Sit is defined as above. Cit indicates that i is located in a watershed directly targeted
by the compact, and that the compact is active in Year t. I test the effect of the Great
Lakes Compact and the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement separately.
1.4.2.2. Extensions on main specifications
I conduct three extensions on the main analysis. First, I consider the effect of authorization
on border rivers. As previously discussed, the predicted effect of authorization on border
rivers differs categorically from the simple upstream-downstream neighbor scenario. I test
the effect of authorization on border rivers under a separate specification:

W Qit = α + β1 [B = 1]it + β2 [B = 2]it + Xit + ϵit (4)

Where [B = 1] indicates that at least one neighbor of the border river is authorized, and
[B = 2] indicates that both neighbors are authorized. I include specifications with controls
and interactions. Continuous controls are averaged across the two border states (income,
LCV score, GDP agriculture/manufacturing), while governorship is equal to 1 if either
governor is a Democrat, and 0 otherwise.
Second, I investigate the effect of spillovers near state borders. Keiser & Shapiro (2018) find
that the benefits of federal grants for wastewater facility improvements are concentrated
within twenty-five miles downstream of the treated facility. If this limit generalizes to
all NPDES pollution, then the effect of upstream authorization would be strongest just
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downstream of the border. I test this effect using the same specification as (2), but include
an interaction variable for authorization and proximity to a state border using an indicator
variable for distance less than ten (twenty) river miles from the upstream border crossing.
Third, I test whether downstream effects are heterogeneous by states’ ability to bargain
and/or cooperate with neighbors. Specifically I test whether spillovers change when neighbors’ governors are of the same political party:

W Qit = Uit + SameP artyit + Uit ∗ SameP artyit + Xit + ϵit (5)

Where SameP artyit indicates that the same party holds the governorship in both State S
and Upstream neighbor U in year t.
1.4.3. Data
1.4.3.1. Water Quality
I measure water quality using an index conversion of dissolved oxygen saturation (DOsat).
DOsat is a commonly used metric in the water economics literature (Keiser & Shapiro,
2018), because it is a general metric of water quality; dissolved oxygen levels are impacted
by municipal and industrial waste, as well as presence of excess bacteria in water. At low
levels of dissolved oxygen, marine life cannot survive.
Dissolved oxygen saturation is calculated from dissolved oxygen and temperature readings,
and indicates the amount of dissolved oxygen in a body of water relative to the maximum
amount that is expected given current water temperature. Water quality is increasing in
DOsat up to 100%, and then declines. I therefore convert DOsat to an index value which
is monotonically increasing in water quality, referred to hereafter as WQI (water quality
index).4 To avoid conflation with seasonal effects, I rely only on samples collected in summer
months.5
4

I construct this index using water quality curves provided in McClelland (1974). This seminal paper is
relied on both in the academic literature as well as many EPA analyses.
5
May through September.

14

I rely on dissolved oxygen water samples from across three sources: the National Water
Information System (NWIS), Legacy Storet dataset (“LegStor”), Modern Storet (“ModStor”). NWIS samples are collected by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) across
the entire sample period. The Storet data is compiled by the EPA and includes samples
collected by the EPA, state agencies, universities, environmental organizations, and private
citizens. The LegStor data includes samples from the mid-twentieth century through the
mid-1990s, while ModStor begins in the mid-1990s and continues through the present. For
all three datasets, samples are sometimes provided as dissolved oxygen saturation, and are
sometimes provided separately as dissolved oxygen and temperature. I rely on DOsat when
it is available for a station in a given hour (of a specific date); if DOsat is not available, but
dissolved oxygen and temperature are both provided for the same hour, then I calculate
DOsat from these two variables.6
Median water quality across the entire sample is 88.3 on the 100-point water quality index.
86% of the sample is considered fishable (index value of 65), and 51% of the sample is
considered swimmable (index value of 88). Average water quality varies significantly by
region, ranging from 76.5 in the Southeast (38% swimmable) to 90.5 in the Pacific Northwest
(79% swimmable).7 Figure 1.5 presents water quality trends before and after passage of
the Clean Water Act in 1972. Consistent with Keiser and Shapiro (2018), I find that water
quality improves most quickly in the 1960s and then quite gradually over the following
decades. This pre-period trend is likely attributable to technological improvements towards
pollution abatement in the 1960s (Keiser and Shapiro (2018)).
1.4.3.2. River Segment Mapping
To identify a station’s location relative to up/downstream states, I rely on the USGS National Hydrography Dataset (NHD). The NHD is a geospatial network mapping of virtually
all rivers and streams in the continental United States. The NHD divides rivers and streams
into segments, approximately 1 mile in length on average. Segments are constructed such
6
7

DO

mgl
DOperc = 468/(31.5+T
, where T is water temperature in degrees Celsius (Keiser and Shapiro (2018)).
)
I use EPA regions here.
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that all intersections occur at segment end points, which are identified by unique node
numbers. In addition to mapping river networks, the NHD provides segment characteristics
which can be used to trace up and down the network path. The data indicate, for example,
whether a segment is a headwater or terminal point. For segments which are not end points,
the unique identifier of the main path segments directly up and downstream of the segment
are listed, which I use to trace upstream to a state border or headwater.
1.4.3.3. Other Data
I define authorization status using year of NPDES authorization, as provided by the EPA.8
To control for state characteristics and explore heterogeneous effects, I include information
on state-year level income, environmental preferences, political party, and economic characteristics. To measure income, I rely on per capita income9 (adjusted for inflation)10 at the
state-year level. To gauge state-level environmental preferences, I use League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores for House and Senate representatives.11 LCV scores are available
at the state-year level from 1972 through present. I define political control by whether the
governor is a Democrat or Republican in a given year.12 To identify state-level economic
conditions, I calculate the percent of the state’s annual GDP (separately) attributable to
agriculture and manufacturing.13
State-level industry-specific GDP is only available beginning in 1977. For this reason, I
restrict the regression analysis below to 1977-2020. Restricting the study period to 1977
and later is also beneficial in separating the immediate impact of the Clean Water Act from
state authorization.
8

https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-authority
Bureau of Economic Analysis SAINC1 Personal Income Summary: Personal Income, Population, Per
Capita Personal Income
10
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Consumer Price Index, 1913 - present.
11
https://scorecard.lcv.org/scorecard?year=2021
12
Kaplan, Jacob. United States Governors 1775-2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-01-16. https://doi.org/10.3886/E102000V3-92920
13
Bureau of Economic Analysis Gross Domestic Product by State, Real GDP in Chained Dollars (SAGDP9).
9
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1.4.4. Identification: threats and evaluation
The difference-in-difference framework requires that, absent authorization, stream segments
exposed to authorized upstream neighbors would follow parallel water quality trends to
segments which are unexposed. Following the methodology of Keiser and Shapiro (2018),14
I conduct an event study to test whether authorized states behave differently in the preperiod: because the treatment is rolled out to many jurisdictions in different years, I rely on
years-to-treatment. For consistency with the regression analysis, I subset to authorization
changes which occur during the study period of 1977-2020.
The event studies do not demonstrate a sharp effect of authorization, either on own-state or
downstream state water quality. Figure 1.6 suggests a modest delayed benefit of authorization on own-state water quality. Figure 1.7 presents largely null effects on the downstream
state: whereas the pre-period average spans either side of the demeaned (zero) axis with a
large confidence interval, the average falls permanently below zero in the year of upstream
authorization, although the confidence interval persists on either side of the zero-axis.
In addition to investigating the existence of pre-trends, it is important to consider factors
which influence timing of authorization. The specific motivations for timing of state-level
authorization likely depended on whether an individual state implemented waterway protection programs prior to the passage of the Clean Water Act. States with existing programs
could modify those programs to comply with federal standards and quickly receive authorization. States without existing programs would need to first pass legislation to authorize
the existence of a state program, establish funding, and demonstrate feasibility to the EPA.
Additionally, states which anticipated that permit programs would be politically unpopular
(or financially burdensome) would be incentivized to deflect responsibility by accepting the
EPA’s default authority.15
14

I modify Keiser and Shapiro (2018)’s publicly available replication code for water quality trends and the
event studies here, using the water quality data set which I construct and this paper’s identification strategy.
15
Email correspondence with EPA Office of Water Management, Water Permits Division, National Programs
Branch.
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In additional to these institutional explanations, the question of authorization timing is
explored in Sigman (2003). Sigman finds that early authorizers have higher rates of environmental group membership, but are otherwise comparable. Notably, she finds no significant difference in manufacturing intensity or number of water polluters.16 To build on
this assessment, I evaluate water trend over times in early authorizing states (states which
authorize 1972-1976) versus later states (1977 or later). Consistent with Sigman’s findings
linking early authorization to environmental concerns, I find that water quality is higher
in early authorization states in every calendar year of the analysis. However, as demonstrated in Figure 1.8, this difference is one of levels rather than growth: trends over time are
very similar between early and late authorizers. Figure 1.8 cannot directly test pre-trends
because late state authorize in different years, but it provides evidence that late states
are not on a pre-existing different trajectory. Moreover, there is no apparent explanation
for why upstream authorization and downstream water quality deterioration would occur
concurrently except through the policy change. Importantly, among the late authorizers,
no adjacent neighbors authorize in the same year, which would obscure the effect of each
state’s policy change.
I further investigate differences between observations based on authorization exposure through
a series of three balance tests. I first evaluate distance to first upstream “point of interest"
for in-state streams, this variable measures distance to headwaters. For cross-state streams,
this variable measures distance to the closest upstream border. I additionally compare
segments’ control variables of interest. The results of these tests are reported in Table 1.2.
Panel A of Table 1.2 demonstrates that the sample is balanced with regards to segments in
authorized versus unauthorized states. Authorized states are higher income and less likely
to have a Democrat governor, and manufacturing accounts for three percentage points more
of GDP in authorized states than unauthorized ones. However, the two sets of states are
balanced with respect to segments’ proximity to upstream headwaters and border crossings,
16

See Sigman (2003), Table 5.
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and there is no significant different in LCV score.
Panel B compares in-state segments (headwaters in the same state as segment) versus
cross-state downstream segments; significant differences are identified. Segments which are
downstream of another state are, on average, much farther downstream of their border
crossing than in-state segments are from their headwaters. Additionally, they are more
concentrated in states which have lower LCV scores and lower income. These differences
are likely regional: river systems in the eastern half of the country tend to run north-tosouth, and persistent regional differences exist with respects to income and environmental
preferences. I test the explanatory power of regional differences using regional fixed effects in
Column (5); physical disparities persist, but political-economic differences largely disappear.
It is not surprising that in-state and cross-state segments differ in characteristics, but this
balance test failure demonstrates that in-state segments are not a suitable control group for
the analysis. I therefore exclude in-state segments from regression analyses which measure
cross-border effects.
Panel B demonstrates an important limitation of the regression analysis: exposure to upstream neighbors is regionally correlated, as are many of the controls of interest. In addition
to the nationwide analysis, I conduct the main regression analysis on each EPA region separately to capture regional heterogeneous treatment effects.
In Panel C, I subset to interstate segments (i.e. only those with an upstream neighbor) and
conduct balance tests on segments whose upstream neighbor is authorized versus unauthorized. I find that segments with authorized neighbors are slightly farther downstream from
the border crossing than segments with unauthorized upstream neighbors, and are more
likely to be in Republican-controlled states. These differences are weaker with the inclusion
of year fixed effects, and reflect a reasonably balanced comparison group.

1.5.

Results

In this section I present the results of the empirical analysis. The results are generally
consistent with the model predictions: where the model yields ambiguous predictions, I
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typically find no statistically significant effect. I do find evidence that state authorization
yields negative externalities, and that cooperative arrangements provide a positive counterweight.
1.5.1. State Authorization Effects
The model predicts heterogeneous effects of own-state authorization on total in-state pollution levels based on environmental preferences. Correspondingly, I do not find evidence of a
nationally dominant significant effect of authorization at the national level. The coefficient
on own-state authorization, presented in Table 1.3, is positive under all specifications, but
is only marginally significant in the interaction-control specification. In contrast to the
model’s prediction, I do not find environmental preferences have any significant interaction
with authorization. The inconclusiveness of the interaction analysis may be attributable
to beginning the empirical analysis in 1977, at which point many environmentally friendly
states had already authorized. I do find a significant positive interactive effect of income and
authorization, suggesting that preferences for pollution controls are increasing in income.
In contrast to the null results regarding own-state authorization, I find stable evidence of
negative spillover effects on downstream neighbors. Table 1.4 presents the main results. I
find that upstream authorization reduces water quality on cross-state rivers in the downstream state by up to 0.097 standard deviations, significant at the 1% level. At a 5%
significance level, I find that the negative effects of authorization are stronger when the
upstream neighbor is high income, has a Democratic governor, or has a higher GDP share
manufacturing. This result supports the model’s key prediction that state authorization,
whether beneficial or detrimental to water quality in the state itself, is expected to have net
negative effects on the downstream neighbor.
1.5.1.1. Regional Variation
Impacts of authorization are not consistent across regions. Tables 1.13 and 1.14 present
the effects of own-state authorization by EPA region. Region 7 displays positive effects
of own-state authorization with or without the inclusion of controls variations: no other
robust effect is identified. Recall that the specification identifies the effect of authorization
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only for states which authorize in 1977 or later: the results in Region 7 are thus entirely
driven by changes in water quality in Iowa.
More consistent region effects are identifiable in the case of upstream authorization: Tables
1.15 and 1.16 present stable negative effects of upstream authorization for states in Region
1 (Northeast) and 4 (Southeast), as well as positive results in region 8 (Mountain West).
Results in Region 1 are entirely determined by the effects of Maine’s authorization on New
Hampshire, and the sample size is less than 1% of the total set of segments for which
upstream authorization effects can be measured.17 Region 8 accounts for approximately
8% of this sample, and is comprised of geographically large, sparsely populated states.
Region 4, by contrast, comprises 31% of the identified sample. It is unsurprising that the
sample is weighted towards the Southeastern portion of the country for both political and
hydrographic reasons. Unlike western regions, the Southeast has a dense system of river
networks, which predicts a large sampling volume. Additionally, states are more likely
to authorize during the study period if they did not already have monitoring programs
(and therefore cannot easily authorize right away) but do not prefer federal oversight (and
therefore authorize eventually): both characteristics are consistent with the region’s conservatism. Among segments for which upstream authorization can be identified, over 50% are
downstream of four states: Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Alabama (Region 4), and Texas. Three
of these four are in the Southeast or South-Central region. Similarly, among downstream
segments for which upstream authorization can be identified, over 50% are in six states:
Oklahoma, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Maryland. All six of these states
are located in the Southeast or surrounding regions. Taken collectively, the national analysis is clearly weighted towards the Southeast, defined broadly to include the South-Central
region and Appalachian states, and the regional analysis substantiates the claim that the
national-level results are largely driven by negative spillovers in this area of the country.
17

For this calculation, I subset to segments which are downstream of a state which authorizes in the study
period. I also exclude segments which are sampled only once, as these segments drop out of the regression
analysis with the inclusion of segment fixed effects.
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1.5.1.2. Spillovers at Borders
The second key prediction in the model concerns the location of spillovers within the downstream state. Specifically, upstream states are predicted to allow more pollution directly
upstream of a border and thereby cause an increase in pollution on river segments directly
downstream of the border in the neighboring state. Here, the results of the empirical exercise diverge from my predictions as well as the related literature. Whereas Keiser and
Shapiro (2018) find that pollution is concentrated within twenty miles downstream of a
source, I find that spillovers are positive near the border despite being negative on the
downstream state as a whole. In Table 1.6, I measure a statistically significant negative
0.12 standard deviation degradation of water quality in the downstream state, but a statistically significant 0.23 standard deviation improvement in water quality on segments within
10 miles downstream of a border. Table 1.7 presents very similar effects when restricting
to twenty miles downstream of the border. Importantly, the size of the positive effect near
borders is double that of general negative spillovers and robust to various specifications,
indicating that spillovers are not merely closer to zero near borders, but that water quality
actually improves post-upstream-authorization.
The mitigating effect of distance on pollution effects is not necessarily linear, and I compare
the explanatory power of three functional forms of this relationship in Table 1.9. Here, I
interact upstream authorization with downstream state segments’ distance from the upstream border, comparing the explanatory power of a linear relationship versus a logged or
exponential relationship. I find that logged distance is a clear front-runner: whereas linear
distance and distance squared yield trivially small, statistically insignificant coefficients, I
measure a statistically significant negative interaction effect of the natural log of distance.
Thus the negative effect of upstream authorization purportedly increases with distance from
the border, albeit at a decreasing rate.
An explanation for this effect is not obvious, but two hypotheses emerge. First, it is possible
that upstream free-riding does not take the easily spotted form of discharge at the border,
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but instead more subtle mechanisms which may appear farther downstream. In particular,
if upstream neighbors are more lax with enforcement on less prominent rivers, then pollution
may not impact larger river systems until much farther downstream. A second hypothesis
considers the downstream state’s decisions. A downstream neighbor who anticipates noncooperative behavior by their upstream neighbor may focus abatement efforts near the
border, to the detriment of enforcement efforts elsewhere in the state.
To test the plausibility of these varied hypotheses, I measure water quality changes just
upstream of the border (i.e. if State S authorizes, I consider an interaction between State
S’s authorization status and a segment’s location in State S near the downstream neighbor’s
border). I find that water quality deteriorates 0.15 standard deviations in the final 10 miles
before a river crosses into the downstream neighbor; this effect is robust to specification
and significant at the 5% level (see Table 1.8). No significant effect is measurable when
the distance is expanded to 20 miles above the border. These results are consistent with
an event study of water quality on distance from border, as presented in Figure 1.9. I
find that effects of upstream authorization are slightly positive near the border, and only
decline fifty to ninety miles downstream. Taken collectively, the evidence that water quality
declines just upstream of the border, improves just downstream, but declines further into
the downstream state all support the hypothesis that downstream neighbors shift abatement
efforts from other parts of the state to the border.
1.5.2. Regional Cooperation
The model’s third prediction concerns the possibility of reversing state-level free-riding while
maintaining a federalist approach. If states can cooperate with their neighbors, then water
quality may improve relative to the general decentralized scenario. I find marginal evidence
in support of this prediction. Table 1.5 presents estimated effects of each of the Great Lakes
Compact and Chesapeake Bay Agreement. The Great Lakes Compact is associated with
a marginally significant 0.1 standard deviation improvement in water quality, whereas the
Chesapeake Bay Agreement is associated with a statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.2
standard deviations. The results likely underestimate the agreements’ benefits given that
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both watersheds received cooperative engagement prior to the signing of the compacts. I
also find positive effects of the Chesapeake Bay Agreement in reducing agricultural pollutant
loads, discussed further in the following robustness checks section.
There are two likely reasons that the Great Lakes Compact exhibits stronger generalized
water quality benefits than the Chesapeak Bay Agreement. First, the Great Lakes Compact has stronger enforcement mechanisms than the Chesapeake Bay Commission. The
Great Lakes Compact enumerates binding legal restrictions on diversions from the Great
Lakes, whereas the Chesapeake Bay Agreement does not penalize failure to meet habitat
preservation goals. Second, all states included in the Great Lakes Compact border the
lakes. Thus, all participating states stand to benefit from cooperation. By contrast, half
the states included in the Chesapeake Bay Agreement do not border the bay at all.
Tables 1.10 and 1.11 present results of authorization depending on political affiliation of
states relative to their neighbors. While I find no effect of same party affiliation on river
segments within a state’s boundaries, I do find a positive significant impact on border rivers:
when both states are of the same party, water quality on border rivers increases 0.1 standard
deviations. However, there is no significant interactive effect with authorization, providing
no conclusive evidence of soft political cooperation. The collective results across interstate
compacts and political cooperation provide suggestive evidence of cooperation. One of the
two major compacts improves water quality, and I do not rule out the possibility of soft
cooperation, which may take forms other than political alignment.
Finally, I find little effect of state authorization on border river quality. Point estimates
on “either state authorization", i.e. at least one state authorized, are positive, while point
estimates on both-state authorization are generally negative (see Table 1.12). These results
are consistent with the model’s ambiguous predictions regarding border rivers: states face
conflicting incentives, and the direction of the optimal response to a neighbor’s polluting
activity depends on the specific level of pollution and citizen preferences.
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I conduct three exercises to test the robustness of the main results. First, I test the main
result’s sensitivity to the specific sample restrictions selected for the main analysis. Second,
I test whether the results hold using other metrics of water quality. Third, I investigate
sampling patterns to identify trends which would suggest that states alter their sampling
behavior strategically post-authorization.
1.5.2.1. Specification Sensitivity
The main analysis restricts the sample along four relevant dimensions which are tested
here. The stream sample is restricted to segments of stream order four or greater in order
to reduce noise in the sample from very small waterways and streams which are unlikely to
host industrial activity. The sample is restricted to 1977 and later, so as to distinguish the
effect of state authorization from the general effect of the Clean Water Act. The sample
is restricted to interstate waterways to better match the treatment and control group,
as optimal policy may be categorically different for waterways which are fully intrastate.
Finally, I remove segments within 800 meters of a state border from the main analysis
(except for the border river analysis), as there is some measurement error around borders
and segments which cross the border will be arbitrarily categorized as up/downstream. I
find that the main result is sensitive to the exclusion of most of these restrictions.
Estimated downstream spillovers are closer to zero and less statistically significant when
smaller streams are included in the analysis. Table A.1.1 demonstrates how the results
are incrementally weaker as segments of decreasing stream order are included. Whereas
marginally significant results are identified using streams of order 3 or greater, any further
expansion of the sample yields weak results. Stream orders 1 and 2 include many small
waterways, including artificial canals, which are not likely to attract major waterway facilities at all. This test provides policy-relevant evidence that the main negative effects of
decentralized point-source pollution monitoring are concentrated on large waterways, and
that these waterways should be prioritized for federal attention.
I test the results’ sensitivity to the time period selected by extending the sample period
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start year from 1977 to 1972 and 1960 separately, presented in Table A.1.2. The direction of
the coefficient on upstream authorization is consistent across sample periods, but the magnitude and significance are reduced when the time period is expanded. I find a marginally
significant effect of -0.048 standard deviations using 1960 as a start date, and no significant
effect using 1972. This weaker result is expected because the Clean Water Act’s mandatory
water treatment improvements are expected to have positive downstream spillover effects
(Jerch (2021)), while state discretion is expected to have negative downstream effects. For
the twenty-seven states which authorized immediately after the passage of the Clean Water
Act, these treatments cannot be disentangled and so the net observed effect is closer to
zero.
The inclusion of river segments within 800 meters of a state border reduces the magnitude
of the result, however, the effect is modest. The results in Table A.1.3 demonstrate that the
estimated effect of upstream authorization falls from -0.093 to -0.075 when these segments
are included, but that the effect remains statistically significant at the 5% level. This result
is consistent with the expectation that these segments introduce measurement error into
the main analysis.
Lastly, I find a stronger effect of upstream authorization when intrastate river segments
are included in the analysis. Specifically, these segments are downstream of an in-state
headwater, and thus are mechanically never exposed to changes in upstream neighbors’
authorization status. In Table A.1.4, the estimated effect of upstream authorization increases in absolute value from -0.093 to -0.101. The inclusion of intrastate rivers primarily
provides more data on general trends in waterways; if the coefficient on upstream authorization merely reflected a decline in quality enforcement among affected downstream states,
then the inclusion of intrastate waterways would increase the absorption of this decline into
yearly fixed effects. Therefore, this result strengthens the evidence that the main result is
not spurious.
In addition to the sample restrictions, I conduct the main analysis on an unweighted set of
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sample segments, aggregating water quality readings to the segment-year level. Sampling
volume varies hugely by segment, and an alternative specification method weights segmentyear observations by total number of observed readings (Keiser and Shapiro (2018)). I find
that measured downstream spillovers are more pronounced under this specification than
the main one; I estimate a 0.16 to 0.19 standard deviation decline in water quality in the
downstream state using the weighted sample (see Table A.1.5). I also identify a more visually
apparent negative effect of upstream authorization in the observation-weighted event study
(Figure A.1.1) than in the main non-weighted version (Figure 1.7).
1.5.2.2. Other Pollutant Metrics
Dissolved oxygen saturation is the preferred metric for water quality in this analysis because
it is a general metric of water quality frequently sampled across the entire continental United
States. However, this generality precludes the opportunity to disentangle different forms
of pollution. In this extension, I conduct the main analysis on six additional water quality
indicators: levels of nitrates, phosphates, fecal coliforms, biochemical oxygen demand, lead,
and mercury.
Importantly, this exercise provides a crucial robustness check in distinguishing agricultural
versus urban/industrial pollution. The Clean Water Act exclusively targets point source
pollution, meaning pollutants which are discharged at a single location into a river. It
does not address non-point source pollution, which refers to pollution which seeps into the
waterway from a large dispersed area and includes agricultural and urban runoff. Nitrates
and phosphates are largely associated with agricultural pollution, whereas the remaining
four metrics are associated with industrial activity and municipal sewage treatment. Thus,
the analysis should find no effect of authorization (upstream or otherwise) on nitrate or
phosphate concentrations in water. The two compacts studied here, however, do target a
wider range of pollutants and therefore do not necessarily yield a null result in expectation.
The expected effect of authorization on point source pollutants (fecal coliforms, biochemical oxygen demand, lead, and mercury) is tempered by the small sample sizes for these
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pollutants. Whereas I rely on 1.3 million samples over more than 42,000 segment-years in
the dissolved oxygen analysis, mercury is only observed in approximately 17,000 samples
over 1,300 segment-years (see Table A.1.6 for all observation counts by metric). Thus, I
expect these extensions to be under-powered relative to the main analysis.
Whereas dissolved oxygen has a non-monotonic relationship to water quality, all indicators
in this extension are direct pollutants and therefore do not require an index conversion.
As in the primary analysis, I convert the metrics to z-scores for ease of interpretation. I
additionally negate z-scores to make the direction of the coefficients consistent with that
of the primary analysis: a positive coefficient corresponds to an increase in water quality.
Table A.1.7 presents the main results across all six metrics.
I find no evidence of detrimental downstream spillovers when testing the effect of authorization on each pollutant separately. Apart from dissolved oxygen saturation, fecal coliforms
and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) are the most reliable metrics of point-source pollution, being heavily sampled across most states. I find a positive point estimate on upstream
authorization for BOD under all specifications, suggesting positive downstream spillovers,
but no statistically significance effect. In the case of fecal coliforms, I find that the direction
of the coefficient is sensitive to the inclusion of controls.
I find statistically significant effects of decentralization on both lead and mercury levels,
although the form of these effects are not consistent across the two pollutants. Own-state
authorization is associated with a 0.5 standard deviation improvement in water quality, as
measured by a reduction in mercury. This estimate is robust across specifications and is
significant at the 1% level. However, I find no consistent impact of authorization on mercury
levels in downstream states. By contrast, I find no effect of own-state authorization on lead
levels, but strong evidence of positive downstream spillovers: water quality improves by
0.56 to 0.74 standard deviations, as measured by a reduction in lead.
These pollutant-specific trends diverge from the main results using dissolved oxygen satu-
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ration. Whereas the main analysis finds negative downstream spillovers, decentralization
appears to have beneficial effects with regards to own-state mercury levels and downstream
lead levels. This divergence may be caused by differences in where sampling is concentrated,

18

as several states have a much larger share of mercury and lead samples than of

dissolved oxygen. Alternatively, states may perceive lead and mercury contamination to
be more serious than biochemical oxygen demand or fecal coliforms, and use authorization
to increase stringency against these specific pollutants. The results pertaining to mercury
and lead provide further evidence that while negative spillovers dominate at the national
level, significant interstate variation exists, and in some states decentralization may even
be beneficial in reducing heavy metals in waterways.
Consistent with the prediction that authorization should not impact agricultural pollution
levels, I find no statistically significant effect of own-state or upstream state authorization
on either phosphates or nitrates. These estimates provide evidence that the main result is
driven by point source pollution rather than spuriously driven by increases in agricultural
activity.
The two interstate compacts studied here target general watershed health, and therefore
may influence agricultural pollutant levels. As presented in Table A.1.8, the Chesapeake
Bay Watershed Agreement is associated with a modest reduction in both nitrate and phosphate levels in surface waters in the targeted watersheds. I find a 0.08 standard deviation
improvement in water quality with respect to nitrates, and a 0.025 standard deviation improvement with respect to phosphates, significant at the 5 and 1% levels respectively. These
results mitigate the main findings concerning the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement
to suggest some success with regards to watershed health. However, I do find a negative
association between the agreement and quality as measured using fecal coliforms, and I find
no effect of the Great Lakes Compact on any of the metrics considered here.
18

Overall geographic distribution is similar across the three measures: a Herfindahl–Hirschman index over
state-level shares of within-metric sampling yields a value of 0.051 for each of dissolved oxygen saturation,
lead, and mercury. For this calculation, I use segment-year as the level of observation.

29

1.5.2.3. Sampling Patterns
The water quality samples used for this study are compiled by the EPA and USGS, but are
originally sourced from a highly decentralized variety of sources. The STORET databases
include samples collected by universities, federal regulators, state agencies, and private
citizens. While this grassroots approach to testing provides a large number of samples, I
cannot rule out the possibility of strategic sampling. In particular, strategic sampling could
bias the results if state agencies reduce testing in areas where they permit greater discharge,
or increase testing in areas most vulnerable to out-of-state externalities.19
For all river segments in the sample, I regress the number of tests on authorization status,
for both own-state and upstream state authorization. I additionally investigate changes in
number of samples around state borders: if sampling is impacted by state governments’
strategic preferences, we would expect a decrease in sampling in the vicinity upstream of
a border (in the upstream polluting state), and an increase in the vicinity downstream of
the border (in the affected state). I find no statistically significant effect of authorization,
either own-state or upstream, on number of water quality samples, nor do I identify any
significant border effects. Additionally, all point estimates are negative: if states were
strategically samples, the direction of the effect would move in opposite directions for an
upstream versus downstream neighbor.

1.6.

Conclusion

In this paper, I investigate whether state authorization impacts water quality for a state
and its downstream neighbors. In particular, I investigate heterogeneity in impacts based
on environmental preferences, region, and proximity to state borders. I find that negative
spillovers into downstream states increase when water quality regulation shifts from the
federal government to individual states, but that well-constructed interstate agreements
can alleviate externalities at the regional level. I find that negative spillovers are mostly
clearly identified in the Southeast, and that effects are not concentrated at state borders.
19

Keiser and Shapiro (2018) use a similar sample and discuss how no sampling design explains monitoring
patterns. However, that paper was not focused on interstate spillovers, and may not have evaluated
sampling patterns against the characteristics most relevant for this study.
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This study investigates one set of costs attributable to a federalist approach. I do not
attempt a complete welfare assessment of decentralization, but rather provide evidence
which supports some degree of centralized oversight. The results concerning compacts
suggests that regional agreements can serve a useful function in cooperative federalism.
Two key questions emerge from this study which provide scope for future research. First, it
is evident that spillovers are not constant across states, but reliable predictors of a state’s
propensity to free-ride remain elusive. Future work may investigate the effect of industryspecific shocks to identify key motivators for state regulatory behavior. Second, this study’s
counter-intuitive findings surrounding state border areas leaves open the exact mechanism
for downstream spillovers. Further studies may consider the detailed hydrographic conditions which determine downstream pollution accumulation to more precisely identify key
sources of pollution in affected states.
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1.7.

Figures
Figure 1.1: Model State

Figure 1.2: Upstream Mapping to State Boundaries

Lines represent mapping from locations where water is sampled to upstream borders (dark blue), border
rivers (red), or in-state headwaters (light blue). Sample is restricted to larger rivers, defined as stream
order greater than or equal to 4.
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Figure 1.3: NPDES Authorization Year

Source: “NPDES State Program Authority," US EPA. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico
do not have authorization under the NPDES program.

Figure 1.4: Interstate Compact Watersheds

Watersheds are defined using the USGS National Hydrography Dataset Plus (NHDPlus).
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Figure 1.5: Water Quality Trends, 1962 - 2020

Clean Water Act is passed in 1972. Includes stream segment fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at
the state level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or greater and at least 800 meters from a
state border.

Figure 1.6: Water Quality: Years to Authorization

Includes stream segment and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or greater and at least 800 meters from a state border,
in states which authorized in 1977 or later.
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Figure 1.7: Years to Upstream Authorization

Includes stream segment and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Sample is restricted to segments downstream of state border, of stream order 4 or greater and at least 800
meters from a state border, which were exposed to upstream authorization in 1977 or later.

Figure 1.8: Early vs Late Authorizers

Includes stream segment and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or greater and at least 800 meters from a state border.
Early authorizers are those who authorize before 1977.
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Figure 1.9: Authorization Effect by Distance to Border

Includes stream segment and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or greater and at least 800 meters from a state border.
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1.8.

Tables
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Table 1.1: Main Summary Statistics

State
Authorized
(2)

Cross-State
Sample
(3)

Upstream
State
Authorized
(4)

86.2
17.7

-

82.9
88.4

-

Water Quality Index
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

81.72
81.28
81.52
82.22
83.47

82.67
82.71
82.14
82.09
83.39

83.18
82.28
81.93
83.38
83.97

83.08
82.24
81.74
83.22
83.86

Upstream of Station (%)
Border River
State Border Crossing
Canada Border Crossing
Mexico Border Crossing
River start/end

1.00
18.91
0.79
0.38
78.91

0.27
18.32
0.86
0.14
80.40

Downstream of Station (%)
Border River
State Border Crossing
Canada Border Crossing
Mexico Border Crossing
River start/end

24.39
42.17
1.11
0.34
31.83

24.49
43.80
1.17
0.05
30.31

4.6
16.4
50.2

4.4
16.7
51.2

11.7
23.1
46.6

11.4
22.6
45.4

1.83
18.95
47.89
38.69
40.44

1.81
19.33
46.14
39.37
40.59

1.66
19.49
41.96
36.40
35.30

1.68
19.67
39.19
36.33
34.26

All
(1)
Authorization Status (%)
State Authorized
Upstream State Authorized

Distance to Upstream Point (%)
Less than 10 miles
Less than 20 miles
Less than 50 miles
State Characteristics
Agriculture (Percent GDP)
Manufacturing (Percent GDP)
Democrat Governor
Income Per Capita (1000s)
LCV Score

Statistics are calculated over stream-segment year tuples, restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher
and years 1977-2020. Column (1) presents summary statistics over all segment-year tuples; (2) includes only
segment-years for which the segment’s state is located is authorized. (3) includes all segments for which an
upstream neighbor exists (i.e. excludes segments with intrastate headwaters), (4) includes the subset of (3)
for which the upstream neighbor is authorized. State characteristics vary at the state-year level.
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Table 1.2: Balance Tests

Panel A
LT 10 miles
LT 20 miles
LT 50 miles
Dem. Gov.
Agri. Pct GDP
Manu. Pct GDP
LCV Score
Income
Panel B
LT 10 miles
LT 20 miles
LT 50 miles
Dem. Gov
Agri. Pct GDP
Manu. Pct GDP
LCV Score
Income
Panel C
LT 10 miles
LT 20 miles
LT 50 miles
Dem. Gov.
Agri. Pct GDP
Manu. Pct GDP
LCV Score
Income

Mean
Unauthorized
States
0.05
0.15
0.44
0.60
0.02
0.15
38.91
34.73
Other
0.03
0.15
0.51
0.48
0.02
0.18
41.77
41.96
Upstream
Unauthorized
0.17
0.26
0.48
0.59
0.02
0.16
42.30
36.56

Mean
Authorized
States
0.04
0.17
0.51
0.46
0.02
0.18
41.10
42.59
Downstream of
State Border
Crossing
0.12
0.23
0.46
0.45
0.02
0.17
36.65
39.59
Upstream
Authorized
0.11
0.23
0.46
0.44
0.02
0.17
36.02
39.93

Diff:

Diff:
Year FE

Diff:
Year &
Region FE

-0.011
0.020
0.068
-0.138**
0.001
0.031*
2.168
7.859***

-0.012
0.006
0.032
-0.050
-0.002
0.027*
3.748
1.707

-0.003
0.017
0.030
-0.023
-0.004
0.024*
2.697
0.091

0.094***
0.084***
-0.052
-0.036
0.002
-0.009
-5.108**
-2.372**

0.094***
0.086***
-0.048
-0.044*
0.002
-0.008
-5.209**
-1.737***

0.096***
0.086***
-0.038
-0.048*
0.002
-0.002
-1.800
-0.721*

-0.058
-0.031
-0.021
-0.155**
0.008*
0.013
-6.286
3.375

-0.068*
-0.050
-0.049
-0.057
0.006
0.011
-5.644
-1.398

-0.059**
-0.031
-0.021
-0.016
0.008*
-0.008
-3.751
-0.469

Statistics are calculated at the stream-segment year level, restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher
at least 800 meters from a state border. Differences are measured first using no fixed effects, then using
year FE, then year and region fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Political and
economic variables vary at the state-year level; distance to upstream point of interest varies at the segment
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3: Effect of Own-State Authorization on Water Quality

Own-state authorization

(1)
-0.00740
(0.0288)

LCV score
Income
Democrat Governor
GDP Pct Agriculture
GDP Pct Manufacturing

(2)
-0.00844
(0.0314)
-0.00499
(0.00817)
-0.0326
(0.0356)
0.00731
(0.0106)
0.0208
(0.0125)
-0.00639
(0.0115)

Auth. X LCV
Auth. X Income
Auth. X Democrat
Auth. X Agriculture
Auth. X Manufacturing
Controls
Authorization X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

X
207975
0.647

207975
0.647

(3)
0.0828∗
(0.0441)
-0.0124
(0.0130)
-0.125∗∗
(0.0495)
0.0204
(0.0246)
0.0275
(0.0169)
-0.0326
(0.0200)
0.0108
(0.0147)
0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0322)
-0.0177
(0.0272)
-0.00566
(0.0117)
0.0393∗
(0.0202)
X
X
207975
0.648

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: Effect of Upstream Authorization on Water Quality

Own-state authorization
Upstream authorization

(1)
0.0148
(0.0324)
-0.0931∗∗∗
(0.0332)

Upstream LCV Score
Upstream Income
Upstream Democrat Governor
Upstream GDP Pct Agriculture
Upstream GDP Pct Manufacturing

(2)
0.0114
(0.0338)
-0.0974∗∗∗
(0.0344)
-0.00591
(0.00936)
-0.0413
(0.0448)
-0.0102
(0.0174)
0.00378
(0.0111)
-0.0182
(0.0268)

Upstream (Auth. X Ln(LCV))
Upstream (Auth. X Ln(Income))
Upstream (Auth. X Democrat)
Upstream (Auth. X Agriculture)
Upstream (Auth. X Manufacturing)
Controls
Authorization X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

X
40915
0.607

40915
0.607

(3)
0.0181
(0.0335)
-0.0933∗∗
(0.0429)
-0.00604
(0.0229)
0.00529
(0.0399)
0.0409
(0.0258)
-0.00317
(0.0283)
-0.0656∗∗
(0.0288)
-0.00235
(0.0252)
-0.0623∗∗
(0.0292)
-0.0584∗∗
(0.0271)
0.00667
(0.0253)
0.0619
(0.0399)
X
X
40915
0.608

Water quality index is measured in z-scores at the segment-year. All regressions include stream segment and
year fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include income, LCV Score, an
indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent agriculture/manufacturing. All
continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the state-year level. Sample is restricted
to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state border, downstream of another
state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Interstate Compact Effects on Water Quality

Own-state authorization

GLB Watershed X Compact Year

Great Lakes Compact
-0.00464
-0.00557
(0.0285)
(0.0311)
0.104∗∗
(0.0476)

0.0957∗
(0.0491)

CBWA Watershed X Compact Year
Controls
Obs
R-Squared

Chesapeake Bay
Watershed Agreement
-0.00993
-0.00999
(0.0285)
(0.0311)

-0.197
(0.142)
207975
0.647

X
207975
0.647

207975
0.648

-0.196
(0.140)
X
207975
0.648

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 1.6: Upstream Authorization Effects Near Borders (10 Miles)
(1)
0.0177
(0.0322)

(2)
0.0142
(0.0336)

(3)
0.0213
(0.0332)

Upstream authorization

-0.124∗∗∗
(0.0314)

-0.128∗∗∗
(0.0329)

-0.125∗∗∗
(0.0430)

Upstr. Auth. X LT 10 Miles Downstr. of Border

0.230∗∗∗
(0.0642)

0.227∗∗∗
(0.0664)
X

40915
0.607

40915
0.608

0.240∗∗∗
(0.0799)
X
X
40915
0.608

Own-state authorization

Upstream Controls
Upstream Auth. X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, downstream of another state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Upstream Authorization Effects Near Borders (20 Miles)
(1)
0.0186
(0.0324)

(2)
0.0151
(0.0338)

(3)
0.0219
(0.0335)

Upstream authorization

-0.137∗∗∗
(0.0245)

-0.140∗∗∗
(0.0269)

-0.138∗∗∗
(0.0391)

Upstr. Auth. X LT 20 Miles Downstr. of Border

0.192∗∗∗
(0.0654)

0.187∗∗∗
(0.0660)
X

40915
0.607

40915
0.608

0.194∗∗∗
(0.0708)
X
X
40915
0.608

Own-state authorization

Upstream Controls
Upstream Auth. X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, downstream of another state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 1.8: Authorization Effects Upstream of Border (10 Miles)

Own-state authorization

Auth. X LT 10 Miles Upstream of Border

(1)
-0.00753
(0.0291)

(2)
-0.00521
(0.0318)

(3)
0.0512
(0.0509)

-0.147∗∗
(0.0592)

-0.151∗∗
(0.0586)

-0.150∗∗
(0.0611)

-0.0135
(0.0154)

-0.0167
(0.0188)

GDP Pct Manufacturing

Auth. X Manufacturing
Controls
Auth. X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

X
111045
0.615

111045
0.615

0.00919
(0.0183)
X
X
111045
0.615

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, on an interstate river, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.9: Distance and Upstream Authorization Effects
(1)
0.0159
(0.0321)

(2)
0.0209
(0.0321)

(3)
0.0123
(0.0325)

Upstream authorization

-0.0839∗
(0.0489)

0.109
(0.106)

-0.105∗∗∗
(0.0373)

Upstream Auth X Dist.

-0.0000699
(0.000220)

Own-state authorization

-0.0493∗∗
(0.0218)

Upstream Auth X ln(Dist.)
Upstream Auth X Dist.2
Obs
R-Squared

40915
0.607

40915
0.607

0.000000305
(0.000000279)
40915
0.607

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, on an interstate river, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 1.10: Political Party Impact on Water Quality
(1)
-0.0769
(0.0503)

(2)
-0.0810∗
(0.0450)

Same Party

0.0214
(0.0461)

0.0184
(0.0448)

Same Party X Upstream Auth.

-0.0191
(0.0490)

-0.0160
(0.0473)
X
40915
0.607

Upstream authorization

Controls
Obs
R-Squared

40915
0.607

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, downstream of another state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.11: Political Party Impact on Border River Water Quality
(1)
0.0229
(0.0610)

(2)
0.0478
(0.0659)

Both States Authorized

0.0217
(0.0443)

0.00392
(0.0404)

Same Party

0.111∗∗∗
(0.0367)

0.0999∗∗
(0.0385)

Same Party X Both Authorized

-0.0699
(0.0439)

-0.0498
(0.0463)

8471
0.530

-0.172∗∗
(0.0664)
X
8471
0.536

Either State Authorized

GDP Pct Manufacturing
Controls
Obs
R-Squared

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year fixed
effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered by border state pairs. Controls include
income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are calculate as the mean across both states and converted to
z-scores. Governorship is defined as Democratic if either governor is a Democrat. All controls vary at the
state-year level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a
state border, downstream of another state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.12: State Authorization Effects on Border River Water Quality

Either State Authorized

Both States Authorized
Controls
Either Auth. X Controls
Both Auth. X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

(1)
0.00564
(0.0604)

(2)
0.0260
(0.0629)

(3)
-0.0568
(0.102)

(4)
0.0435
(0.0548)

-0.0102
(0.0427)

-0.0211
(0.0344)
X

-0.0185
(0.0348)
X
X

-0.0276
(0.0436)
X

8471
0.528

8471
0.534

8471
0.534

X
8471
0.535

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year fixed
effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered by border state pairs. Controls include
income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are calculate as the mean across both states and converted to
z-scores. Governorship is defined as Democratic if either governor is a Democrat. All controls vary at the
state-pair-year level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.13: Regional Authorization Effects

Own-state authorization
Obs
R-Squared

(1)
-0.146
(0.140)
948
0.537

(2)
0.302∗
(0.0338)
603
0.624

(3)
-0.0760
(0.0504)
4465
0.500

(4)
0.0638
(0.0625)
11446
0.715

(5)
0
(.)
4183
0.571

(6)
0.000872
(0.0814)
8092
0.528

(7)
0.760∗∗∗
(0.0836)
4357
0.619

(8)
0.115∗∗
(0.0330)
4002
0.389

(9)
0.165
(0.112)
1763
0.422

(10)
-0.0217
(0.0321)
1056
0.561

(9)
0.562∗∗∗
(0.0498)
X
1763
0.461

(10)
-0.0831
(0.0540)
X
1056
0.563

Table 1.14: Regional Authorization Effects - All Controls

Own-state authorization
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Controls
Obs
R-Squared

(1)
0.0918
(0.234)
X
948
0.543

(2)
0.235
(0.0389)
X
603
0.632

(3)
-0.168
(0.169)
X
4465
0.509

(4)
0.0964
(0.0510)
X
11446
0.718

(5)
0
(.)
X
4183
0.573

(6)
0.0416
(0.121)
X
8092
0.532

(7)
0.813∗∗∗
(0.0928)
X
4357
0.620

(8)
0.0156
(0.0483)
X
4002
0.393

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard
errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the state-year level. Sample is restricted to segments of
stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state border, downstream of another state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Region 1: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, and VT. Region 2: NJ, NY. Region 3: DE, DC, MD, PA, VA, WV. Region 4: AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, and TN.
Region 5: IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, and WI. Region 6: AR, LA, NM, OK, and TX. Region 7: IA, KS, MO, and NE. Region 8: CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, and
WY. Region 9: AZ, CA, NV. Region 10: ID, OR, WA.

Table 1.15: Regional Upstream Authorization Effects

Own-state authorization

Upstream authorization
Obs
R-Squared

(1)
-0.170
(0.134)

(2)
0.461
(0.126)

(3)
-0.0718
(0.0541)

(4)
0.0516
(0.0570)

(5)
0
(.)

(6)
0.00208
(0.0865)

(7)
0.761∗∗∗
(0.0852)

(8)
0.134∗∗∗
(0.0300)

(9)
0.191
(0.102)

(10)
0.0224
(0.0298)

-0.959∗∗∗
(0.0711)
948
0.554

0.427
(0.283)
603
0.629

0.0185
(0.0407)
4465
0.500

-0.151∗
(0.0656)
11446
0.716

-0.00317
(0.157)
4183
0.571

-0.0920
(0.0793)
8092
0.529

0.0153
(0.0645)
4357
0.619

0.174∗∗
(0.0638)
4002
0.390

-0.194
(0.0929)
1763
0.423

0.0830∗
(0.0197)
1056
0.561

Table 1.16: Regional Upstream Authorization Effects - All Controls

Own-state authorization
48
Upstream authorization
Controls
Obs
R-Squared

(1)
-0.377∗
(0.175)

(2)
0.163
(0.225)

(3)
-0.0521
(0.0590)

(4)
0.0104
(0.0536)

(5)
0
(.)

(6)
-0.0177
(0.0748)

(7)
0.718∗∗∗
(0.0896)

(8)
0.110∗∗
(0.0324)

(9)
0.0219
(0.0350)

(10)
0.0148
(0.0480)

-1.618∗∗∗
(0.330)
X
948
0.574

0.276
(0.328)
X
603
0.638

-0.0785
(0.0727)
X
4465
0.505

-0.197∗∗
(0.0611)
X
11446
0.717

-0.202
(0.264)
X
4183
0.575

-0.0736
(0.0727)
X
8092
0.530

0.00793
(0.0708)
X
4357
0.620

0.118∗
(0.0566)
X
4002
0.393

-0.348∗∗
(0.0603)
X
1763
0.466

0.0728
(0.0429)
X
1056
0.562

Water quality index is scaled from 0 to 1, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard
errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include income (ln(per capita in 1000s of 2020 dollars)), ln(LCV Score), an indicator for whether the
governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent agriculture. All controls vary at the state-year level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4
or higher, 800 meters or more from a state border, downstream of another state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Region 1: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, and VT. Region 2: NJ, NY. Region 3: DE, DC, MD, PA, VA, WV. Region 4: AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, and TN.
Region 5: IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, and WI. Region 6: AR, LA, NM, OK, and TX. Region 7: IA, KS, MO, and NE. Region 8: CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, and
WY. Region 9: AZ, CA, NV. Region 10: ID, OR, WA.

CHAPTER 2 : Estimating Willingness-to-Pay for Water Quality in the US
2.1.

Introduction
I can tell you that Flint, Michigan is the tip of the iceberg... I can tell you for
certain that this is a national crisis that we are not getting ready to face. The
crisis is already here.
Erin Brockovich, environmental activist (2016)

Soon after the first scientific discoveries concerning the sources and consequences of drinking
water contaminants in the late 19th century, the United States Public Health Service (PHS)
set standards to regulate water utilities. These standards evolved through the first half of
the 20th century, and by 1962 all 50 states had created regulations or guidelines for public
water systems. Nevertheless, in 1969 only 60 percent of water systems delivered water
which met all PHS standards and over half of treatment facilities had major deficiencies.20
In response, the federal government passed the Clean and Safe Drinking Water Acts of
1972 and 1974, respectively. These acts increased federal infrastructure spending on water
utilities from less than $2.5 billion to almost $20 billion by the late 1970s (Congressional
Budget Office (2015)). This led to significant water quality improvements in the country.
Today, the United States is again experiencing a drinking water crisis. The country faces
chronic under-investment in water infrastructure (American Society of Civil Engineers
(2020a)) and as many as 63 million people were exposed to potentially unsafe water more
than once during the past decade (Philip et al., 2017). High profile cases like that of Flint,
Michigan have drawn attention to the issue and increased concerns about drinking water
quality. However, the high sticker price of infrastructure improvements generates debate
over whether these investments are fully justified.
Our paper addresses this question by evaluating potential benefits of investments in water
infrastructure that would tackle the US drinking water crisis. Specifically, we consider the
20

EPA (1999), EPA (2000)
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extent to which households value improvements in drinking water quality (Greenstone and
Jack, 2013). We therefore build and estimate a model of drinking water consumption to
recover households’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for improvements in drinking water quality.
Our model builds on two empirical observations. First, that households react to decreases
in drinking water quality by increasing their consumption of alternatives to tap water.
Specifically, bottled water. Second, that these reactions are heterogeneous. Higher income
households have a stronger reaction to changes in drinking water quality.
Households’ avoidance behavior in the form of increased consumption of bottled water
reveals a WTP for water quality. Therefore, in our model households face a discrete choice
between two sources of drinking water: tap and bottled water. Households’ preferences for
these alternatives depend on the cost of bottled water and on the quality of tap water. Our
model captures heterogeneity in avoidance behavior by allowing these preferences to vary
with income.
To estimate the model, we use number of EPA water standards violations as a measure
of water quality. Because utilities are required to inform consumers of existing violations,
violations serve as a salient, quantifiable indicator of water quality with temporal and
geographic variation. Mandatory notifications provide objective information about the risks
of consuming tap water that is in violation of the EPA standards: see Appendix A.6.2 for
an example of a Tier 1 notification template. Furthermore, EPA violations constitutes
the best available measure of drinking water quality at the national level. Nevertheless,
violations are not an all-encompassing measure of drinking water quality. We are unable to
evaluate avoidance behavior that may arise from concerns such as water taste or lead pipes
in housing. Households may also react more strongly to a water quality issue when it is
labeled as a violation: we cannot disentangle the “alarm" effect from the information effect.
We find that the average household’s marginal WTP for an improvement of one standard
deviation in water quality is $2.33 per gallon of drinking water. This amounts to an annual
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WTP of $162.12 for a household consuming a typical level of plain drinking water. We also
find that there are significant differences in WTP by income levels. A household with an
income of $95,000 is willing to pay $6.57 per gallon of drinking water, while a household
with an income of $35,000 is willing to pay $0.70.
We use these estimates to compute aggregate willingness to pay under two counterfactual
scenarios. First, we focus on US households which receive tap water from utilities with at
least one violation in the period of 2000 to 2017. We find that these households would have
been willing to pay $15.9 billion per year to reduce these violations to zero. This figure is
approximately 9 times higher than the average annual budget of the EPA’s Drinking Water
State Revolving Loan Fund (DWSRF),21 and is comparable to the EPA’s estimated needs
for rehabilitation, replacement and upgrade of existing infrastructure for the next 20 years,
which totals approximately $17.2 billion dollars annually. These comparison points suggest that households’ valuation of high-quality drinking water justifies the public spending
needed to guarantee that all water utilities meet the existing EPA standards.
Our second counterfactual attempts to evaluate total public spending on water utilities,
noting that water infrastructure would rapidly depreciate in the absence of this spending.
We consider a hypothetical scenario where this depreciation leads to a nationwide crisis
of the same level as that of Flint, MI in 2014. Under this extreme scenario, we find an
aggregate WTP of $160 billion per year to restore safe drinking water. This amount is
41% higher than total annual public spending22 in water infrastructure, indicating that
households’ WTP easily reconciles current public spending on water utilities.
Together our results suggest that households’ valuation of drinking water quality justifies
current spending on drinking water infrastructure and likely justifies much larger investments. The recently approved infrastructure bill proposed by the Biden administration
takes steps in this direction by increasing the DWSRF by an average of $7 billion over the
21

The DWSRF is a federal financial assistance program to help water systems and states to achieve the
health protection objectives of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
22
Congressional Budget Office (2018)

51

next five years.23 . However, we find that this increase may still fall short of households’
willingness-to-pay for safe drinking water access.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we contribute to the literature attempting
to estimate willingness-to-pay for environmental quality. Quantifying WTP for publicly
provided environmental amenities is notoriously elusive; previous papers have used surveybased methods (Chatterjee et al., 2017; Jordan and Elnagheeb, 1993; Beaumais et al., 2014;
Whitehead, 2006), which have been heavily criticized in the past (Hausman (2012)). An
emerging literature exploits revealed preferences to obtain more reliable estimates of WTP
for environmental amenities, including air quality in China (Ito and Zhang (2020)) and
water quality in Kenya (Kremer et al. (2011)). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
the first to estimate WTP for drinking water quality in the US using a revealed preference
approach, which allow us to conduct a comparison to survey-based estimates.
Our second contribution is to the ongoing discussion regarding infrastructure spending in
the United States. Our analysis of households’ avoidance behavior offers an alternative
measure of the benefits of drinking water infrastructure investments. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the first to introduce this alternative. Our findings and methodology
complement existing cost-benefit analysis methods based on the value of statistical life used
by the EPA (Viscusi and Aldy (2003)).
Finally, we contribute to the literature concerning avoidance and averting behavior against
drinking water pollution (Zivin et al., 2011; Allaire et al., 2019; Whitehead et al., 1998).
We study households’ responses to changes in drinking water quality and consider other
alternatives to tap water besides bottled water. We do not find evidence that households
increase their consumption of these other alternatives.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides the institutional setting
and describes the data. Section 2.3 presents reduced form evidence of households’ avoidance
behavior. Section 2.4 introduces our model of drinking water consumption. In Section 2.5
23

EPA (2021), Volcovici (2021)
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we present our counterfactual results. In Section 2.6 we conclude.

2.2.

Institutional Setting and Data

2.2.1. Drinking Water Quality in the US
The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 established drinking water quality standards for all
public water systems24 in the country. These standards set maximum contaminant levels
(MCLs) for over 90 contaminants in drinking water and establish rules for water-testing
schedules and methods.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces these standards indirectly through
state agencies.25 Testing results are not reported to the EPA and no centralized data source
contains this information. Instead, states report violations to the EPA on a quarterly basis.
This information is available to the public, at the water system level, through the Safe
Drinking Water Act Information System (SDWIS).
Violations are classified into three tiers. A Tier 1 violation is one with significant potential
to have serious adverse health effects on human health as a result of short term exposure.
Tier 2 violations are those with potential to have serious adverse health effects on human
health. Tier 3 includes all other violations not included in Tier 1 or Tier 2. Public water
systems must inform their customers of any violation but the required time frame varies by
tier; whereas systems have a full year to provide notice of Tier 3 violations, Tiers 1 and 2
require 24 hours and 30 days notice respectively. Table 2.1 provides additional information
regarding violation classification.
Given the salience of water quality violations and the limitations on the availability of testing
results, we use SDWIS violations data to measure water quality. The data spans the period
from 2000 to 2017. For each violation we observe characteristics of the offending water
system and details about the violation. Specifically, the data contains system characteristics
24

EPA defines a public water system (PWS) as an entity that provides water for human consumption to at
least 25 people (or at least 15 connections) for at least 60 days a year.
25
With the exception of Washington DC and Wyoming.
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(system type26 , population served and county served) and violation information (period of
non-compliance, contaminant and tier).
We restrict the data to Tier 1 and 2 (e.g. health-based) violations and compute the total
number of new at the county-year27 . Table 2.2 presents key summary statistics. The median
number of violations in the data is zero and in a given year most counties experience at
most one violation.
The above summary statistics mask significant geographic and time variation in water quality. Figure 2.1 presents the maximum number of new violations across years for each county
in the data. This figure demonstrates that most counties experience at least one violation
across the study period, and that counties which experience two or more violations are concentrated in the South-Central region, with clusters of high violation counties throughout
the country.
2.2.2. Bottled Water and Soft Drinks Data
When households seek to avoid consuming contaminated tap water, they are likely to seek
alternatives such as bottled water and soft drinks. We rely on the Nielsen Homescan Data
(HMS) to measure purchases of these beverages. Under the Nielsen Homescan survey,
household report their retail purchases over the course of the year; participants also provide
standard demographic information about their household. This survey yields an unbalanced
panel of over 60,000 households spanning the period from 2004 to 2017. For each purchase,
we observe the product category (e.g. bottled water or soft drinks), total ounces and dollars
amount spent. We aggregate the purchase data to the household-product category-year
level.
We additionally rely on the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data (RMS), which provides an unbal26

Systems can be one of three types 1) community water system, which is a public water system that
supplies water to the same population year-round. 2) non-transient non-community water system, which is
a public water system that regularly supplies water to at least 25 of the same people at least six months
per year. 3) transient non-community water system, which is a public water system that provides water in
a place such as a gas station or campground where people do not remain for long periods of time.
27
See Appendix A.5 for details on data processing.
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anced panel of 35,000 retailers which report all transactions to Nielsen. We compute price
per gallon of bottled water at the county-year level by dividing total bottled water revenue
by total gallons sold.28
In table 2.3 we present summary statistics of households’ characteristics and consumption
of bottled water and soft drinks.
The average household in our data earns $51,565 per year, has 2 household members and
does not have children. The majority of the households are white and in roughly half of
them at least one person is college educated.
Households consume an average of 13 gallons of bottled water per year, with households in
the 95th percentile purchasing as much as 54 gallons (equivalent to consume 18 ounces of
bottled water per day). The average spending and number of purchases of bottled water
is low; the average household spends only $50 per year on 13 gallons of bottled water,
distributed over fewer than 5 purchases every year. The average price per gallon of bottled
water is $11.92; this high price is driven by the unit size for a typical purchase. Most
purchases are made for 12-16 ounce bottles, for which the price per quantity of water is
substantially higher than that of large containers.
Average consumption of soft drinks is considerably higher. Households spend roughly 3.5
times more in soft drinks, consume 1.5 times more gallons and make 3 times more purchases
of soft drinks than bottled water.
2.2.3. NHANES Data
The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) is a biannual survey
conducted by the US Center for Disease Control (CDC) to study health and nutrition patterns across a nationally representative sample of approximately 5,000 people. Of particular
interest to this study is that NHANES records participants’ consumption of plain water the
day prior to interview, specifying the quantity of tap versus bottled water. NHANES additionally reports standard demographic data; we use match NHANES data from 2010
28

See Appendix A.5 for details on data processing.
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through 2017 to estimate county-level variation in average daily water consumption based
on American Community Survey (ACS) county-level demographics.29

2.3.

Evidence of Avoidance Behavior

In this section we explore the relationship between water quality and consumption of bottled
water and soft drinks. We consider the following model:

yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t

(2.1)

Where yh,c,t represents consumption of the relevant product (bottled water, soft drinks)
by household h in county c in year t. Consumption is measured separately using each of
total ounces purchased and number of purchases. Violationsc,t is the total number of new
violations in county c and year t, Incomeh,t is the mean-centered annual income of household
h in year t. Xh,t is a vector of household characteristics, ρt and µc are year and county
fixed effects respectively.
2.3.1. Threats to Identification
In this section we address threats to the reduced form approach. First, we address whether
the treatment group, i.e. households living in counties which experience a new violation
in the survey year, and the control group (households in counties which experience no
new violations) are comparable. Second, we address whether households have information
regarding water quality which is not observed in our data, and how this outside information
would influence our analysis.
Households are assigned a weighted sum of violations across their county. For this reason,
many households are observed as experiencing a fraction of a violation, preventing a clean
division of the sample into a treated and untreated group. The median household in the
HMS lives in a county which experiences 0.85 cumulative violations across the study period.
29

See Appendix A.5 for details on data processing.
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3.2% of households live in counties which never experience a violation, and 3.7% live in
counties experiencing five or more.
First we conduct a set of balance tests to evaluate whether low and high violation groups
are demographically similar, presented in Table 2.4. The results mirror violation patterns
identified in the geographical analysis: statistically significant demographic differences exist
between low, middle, and high violation counties. Households in no-violation counties are
demographically similar across income and education to other households, but are slightly
smaller, more likely to be Black, and less likely to be Hispanic. Households in very high violation counties (five violations or more) are most demographically divergent; mean income
is approximately $3,500 lower, and these households are more likely to have less than high
school education (6 versus 4%), less likely to be college educated (25%, compared to 30%
among households in counties with fewer than five violations), and less likely to be Black
or Hispanic.
As demonstrated in Table 2.4, differences between low and high violations households are
statistically significant, typically at the 1% level, even under the inclusion of state and year
fixed effects. However, the economic magnitude of these differences requires more careful
consideration. Counties with either no violations or 5+ violations are unusual, comprising
3.4% and 3.6% of the sample respectively. A cutoff of 1 violation, by contrast, provides
a more even division of the population: 40.2% of HMS households live in counties which
experience at least one violation. In Panel B, we see that while statistically significant
differences exist with regards to household size, percent Hispanic, and high school education,
the magnitude of these differences in small. Persisting demographic differences - namely,
that households in counties with one or more violations are slightly lower income, less likely
to be Black, and less likely to be college educated - are consistent with the geographic
patterns identified in Figure 2.1. Violations are concentrated in rural areas and the central
Southwest, which are not demographically symmetric to urban areas or other regions. For
this reason, county fixed effects serve an important role in absorbing geographic variation
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and any time-invariant county-level characteristics.
Differences between the treatment and control groups are relevant specifically because they
may also influence bottled water purchases. If households in high-violation counties tend to
purchase more (or less) bottled water irrespective of violations, our results may be biased
towards zero. Figure 2.230 presents bottled water purchases over time among households
in counties experiencing at least one violation compared those experiencing fewer than
one cumulative violation. Households in high-violation counties consistently purchase more
bottled water than households in low-violation counties, regardless of whether they are in
the pre or post violation period. Notably, while the two groups’ confidence intervals overlap
substantially, the size of the gap between groups is consistent over time. This finding
suggests that high-violations households are not shifting to bottled water at a faster rate
than low-violation households. The direction of this result is consistent across cutoffs.
A likely explanation for high-violations households’ higher consumption of bottled water
is private information. If households have more information about their water system
than that which can be deduced from the violations data, then these households may have
information about compromised water quality even outside of a violations period. This
explanation would bias our results towards zero: households are engaging in avoidance
behavior, but will experience a smaller increase in bottled water purchases after a violation
if they are already relying on bottled water in the pre-period.
Lastly, we consider the possibility of pre-trends: households are able to predict, or receive
forward notice of, violations and begin engaging in avoidance behavior before the violation
is observed in the data. Figure 2.3 presents bottled water purchase behavior before and
after a county’s first observed violation year. We find no evidence of pre-trends.
30

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 rely on a modified version of Keiser and Shapiro (2018)’s publicly available replication
code for event studies.
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2.3.2. Reduced Form Results
Table 2.5 presents the estimates of Equation (1) using total ounces purchased as our measure
of consumption. The estimates in column 3 suggest that one additional violation leads to
an increase of 50.94 ounces of bottled water purchased. Relative to the average purchases
of bottled water, this represents a 3.2% increase. We find no significant effect of violations
on total ounces of soft drinks when year and county fixed effects (Column 3) are included.
In column 5 we allow the consumption effect of violations to vary with household income.
We again find no significant effect on the consumption of soft drinks. For bottled water, we
find that wealthier households react more strongly to increases in water quality violations.
A household whose income is one standard deviation higher than the average increases its
purchases of bottled water by 87.6 ounces in response to one extra water quality violation.
Relative to the average purchases of bottled water, this represents a 5.5% increase.
In table 2.6 we present the estimates of equation 2.1 using number of purchases as our
measure of consumption. The estimates again indicate the consumption of bottled water
increases with water quality violations and that consumption of soft drinks does not. The
results imply that an increase of one water quality violation leads to 1.1% more purchases
of bottled water relative to the average number of purchases.
We find modest evidence of avoidance behavior under both measures of consumption.
Household consumption of bottled water increases with water quality violations, particularly among high-income households, but households do not appear to substitute to soft
drinks. In Appendix A.6.1 we evaluate the possibility of lagged effects. The effect of current
violations remains similar in magnitude, but is not significant with the inclusion of full fixed
effects. In Appendix A.6.2 we present an extension on the reduced form equation including
interactions of education and race with violations. We again find that the interaction of
income has a significant effect on consumption of bottled water that is similar in magnitude to the one presented above. We do not find statistically significant effect of violations
interacted with either education or race on bottled water consumption.
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Finally, we use our estimates from column 5 of Table 2.5 to perform a back-of-the-envelope
calculation in which we compute the increase in spending attributable to an increase from
zero violations to the level observed in the data. We find that on average these violations
increase annual spending in bottle water by $319 million dollars. This amount represents
only 17% of the average spending of the EPA Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Fund
(DWSRF)31 , which is equal to $1.78 billion per year since its creation in 1996. However, this
number is not adequate to evaluate investments in water infrastructure. The back-of-theenvelope calculation does hold consumer utility constant: consumer utility is presumably
lower with violations than without them. For this reason, the back-of-the-envelope calculation is not sufficient to fully capture willingness-to-pay. To obtain such a measure we
propose a model of households’ utility as a function of violations which allows us to compute
households’ willingness-to-pay to reduce violations while holding utility constant. In the
next section we present a structural framework which allows us to compute a WTP measure
based on bottled water consumption.

2.4.

Demand Model

We construct a model of drinking water consumption which recuperates households’ willingnessto-pay for safe drinking water from observed avoidance behavior. Consider a household’s
choice between drinking one gallon of bottled water (at home) or one gallon of tap water. A household h will choose bottled water if its indirect utility of consuming bottled
TW
water (uBW
h ) exceeds its indirect utility of consuming tap water (uh ). These utilities are

constructed as follows:

W
TW
TW
W
uTh,c,t
= µTh,tW − βh vc,t
− αcTc,tW + ξ˜c,t
+ ϵTh,c,t

uBW
h,c,t

=

µBW
h,t

−

BW
βh vc,t

−

αcBW
c,t

(2.2)

BW
+ ξ˜c,t
+ ϵBW
h,c,t

Where vc,t is water quality measured in violations, cc,t is the cost per gallon of water, ξ˜c,t
31
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is an unobserved product characteristic and ϵh,c,t is a household level shock that follows a
extreme value type-I distribution. Our model relies on the following assumptions:
A1: Bottled water has zero violations against EPA standards.32
BW
BW
BW
A2: The cost per gallon of bottled water is given by cBW
c,t = pc,t + rc,t , where pc,t is
BW comprises all other monetary costs,
the price per gallon of bottled water and rc,t

such as transportation, associated with purchasing one gallon of bottled water. This
assumption on the functional form of the cost of bottled water allows us to identify
BW as long as we have variation in price per gallon pBW that
α without observing rc,t
c,t
BW . These other unobserved monetary cost will then be absorved
is independent of rc,t

into the unobserved product characteristic. In Section 2.4.2 we further discuss instruBW
mentation for the pc,t . For the remainder of the paper, we replace cBW
c,t with pc,t and
BW = ξ˜BW + αr BW .
let ξc,t
c,t
c,t

A3: The cost per gallon of tap water is zero33 .
A4: The household-specific taste parameter βh is a function of the household’s income.
Specifically, we assume βh = β + θmh,t . Where, mh,t is the household’s income.
Given these assumptions, a household will only choose bottled water over tap water if

BW
BW
BW
TW
TW
TW
TW
µBW
h,t − αpc,t + ξc,t + ϵh,c,t ≥ µh,t − βh vc,t + ξc,t + ϵh,c,t

⇒

µBW
h,t

−

µTh,tW

+

TW
βh vc,t

−

αpBW
c,t

32

+

BW
ξc,t

−

TW
ξc,t

+

ϵBW
h,c,t

≥

(2.3)

W
ϵTh,c,t

This assumption does not imply that the utility of bottle water is the same as that of tap water with zero
water quality violations. We allow for state and year differences in utility between these two alternatives.
33
An average U.S. family of four consumes 100 gallons per person per day and pays $72.93 per month for
water as of 2019, implying an average price per gallon of $0.006. The average price of a one-gallon bottle
of water is more than 200 times higher at $1.22.(Tiseo (2021), Boesler (2013)). The price per gallon of
smaller water bottles is considerably higher. Additionally, drinking water comprises less than 1% of tap
water consumption on average; given that water bills likely include some fixed costs, the marginal price per
gallon of drinking water is even closer to zero (WaterTalks (2019)).
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We then redefine the utility of bottled water to be

TW
BW
BW
uBW
h,c,t = µh,t + βh vc,t − αpc,t + ξc,t + ϵh,c,t

(2.4)

W = ϵT W . From this specification we obtain the
and the utility of tap water to be uTh,c,t
h,c,t

marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a reduction of one water quality violation, given
by βh /α.
2.4.1. Estimation
The model implies that the share of households that choose a gallon of bottled water over
tap water is:

sc,t =

T W − αpBW + ξ )
exp(µh,t + βh vc,t
c,t
c,t
T
W
BW
1 + exp(µh,t + βh vc,t − αpc,t + ξc,t )

(2.5)

Notice that this probability depends on household characteristics, violations, and price,
but not on any gallon-specific variables. Therefore, the model predicts that households
will choose the same source of drinking water at home for every gallon they consume,
which implies that we can estimate the model using household-level decisions of water
source (bottled vs tap) instead of unobserved gallon-level decisions. We therefore classify
households as bottled or tap water consumers and compute the share of bottled water
households at the county-year level. Using these market shares and equation (2.5) we can
estimate the model by fitting the parameters to match the shares predicted from the reduced
form exercise.
2.4.2. Identification
To address potential endogeneity of prices, we follow the approach introduced by Hausman
(2008) and applied frequently in the industrial organization literature34 in which a product’s
price in other markets serve as an instrument for price in the selected market. In this
34

For example, Nevo (2001), DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) and Ghose and Han (2014)
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application, we instrument pc,t using the average of pc′ ,t across all other counties in state s
where county c is located in year y.
2.4.3. Model Results
In this section we present the results of our demand model. As previously mentioned,
our estimation strategy requires the classification of households into either bottled water
or tap water consumers. We classify households based on their observed consumption of
bottled water. Specifically, we set an annual household bottled water consumption cutoff
such that all households below the cutoff are classified as tap water consumers, and all
households above it as bottled water consumers. Because the selection of a particular cutoff
is subjective, we define cutoffs based on the distribution of positive consumption of bottled
water and test the model under a range of cutoffs: we present the results using cutoffs
points of the 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th and 60th percentile of the distribution.
Table 2.7 presents the results of our demand model estimation. We emphasize three key
aspects of these results. First, regardless of cutoff point, all point estimates for price and
violations are of the expected sign: price (α) decreases utility of bottled water while violations (β) increases it. Second, our results indicate that household income exacerbates the
effect of violations on utility for bottled water. Third, our estimates are stable across the
selection of cutoffs, although the results are less precise under stricter cutoffs.
To interpret our estimates, we compute marginal willingness to pay for an improvement of
one standard deviation in water quality for the average household within varying income
brackets. The equation is as follows:

β̂ + θ̂ × Income
βˆh
=
× Std. Dev. Violations.
α̂
α̂

(2.6)

In Figure 2.4 we plot MWTP for all six cutoffs. For a household with an income of $50,000,
MWTP ranges from $0.5 to $2.3. This represents a 4.2% to 19.3% increase over the average price per gallon in our data. Figure 2.4 additionally demonstrates that income has a
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significant effect on MWTP. Given our estimates, based on a cutoff of the 30th percentile, a
household with an income of $85,000 is willing to pay $5.0 or 180% more than a household
with an income of $50,000.35
2.4.4. Model’s Interpretation
Our model’s estimate of willingness-to-pay for safe drinking water is likely to be only a
lower bound for a variety of reasons:
1. Imperfect information: Even if households only care about the standards set by the
EPA, they might not be aware of all relevant water quality violations. In this case,
households with a positive WTP may not engage in avoidance behavior due to imperfect information. Our model will not be able to capture this component of willingnessto-pay because we do not observe households’ awareness levels.
2. Alternatives to bottled and tap water: Our model assumes that households’ only alternative to tap water is bottled water. This assumption is motivated by our reduced
form results presented in section 2.3. However, households may engage in avoidance behavior outside the scope of retail beverage purchases, including boiling water,
purchasing water delivery services or water filtration systems, or even moving to a
different location. These behaviors reflect positive WTP for clean water but are not
observed in our analysis.
3. Measurement error in water quality: Our model assumes that households’ perception
of water quality is based only on the number of water quality violations. As discussed
above and demonstrated in Figure 2.2, this is likely not the case. Even in the absence of
an enumerated violation, households may perceive water to be unsafe to drink based on
water taste, housing characteristics, or institutional distrust. In this case households
would avoid tap water in the absence of violations, which reflects a willingness to pay
for water quality that will not be captured in our estimates.
35

In Appendix A.6.2 we present the same figure with the confidence intervals for each cutoff.
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2.5.

Counterfactual Exercises

In this section we use our demand model estimates to evaluate investments in drinking
water infrastructure. Specifically, we rely on our estimates based on the 6.1 gallon (30th
percentile) cutoff in the counterfactual exercises below.
2.5.1. Willingness-to-pay To Reach A Zero Violations Scenario
In our first counterfactual exercise, we evaluate whether households’ willingness-to-pay justifies future investments in drinking water infrastructure improvements. Specifically, we
compute the aggregate WTP across all US households to go from the observed level of
violations to a case of zero water quality violations.
Consider county c in year y. Let the number of water quality violations be vc,t , the county’s
population be Nc,t and the average household’s annual consumption of drinking water at
home be Wc,t , in gallons. Then, given the county’s average household income (mc,t ) we can
compute the county’s aggregate WTP for a reduction of vc,t violations using the following
expression:

Aggregate WTPc,t (vc,t ) =

β̂ + θ̂ × mc,t
× vc,t × Nc,t × Wc,t .
α̂

(2.7)

Finally, we sum over all counties and years to obtain a national willingness-to-pay to achieve
zero water quality violations. We find that in the period spanning 2000 to 2017, the national
WTP totaled $285.4 billion, with a 95% confidence interval of $260.2 to $308.9 billion. This
implies that an average annual national WTP of $15.9 billion.
To compare this estimated benefit against estimated costs, we first consider the EPA Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Fund (DWSRF)36 , which is the main source of federal
support for investments in safe drinking water provision. This fund has provided $41.1
billion in various forms of financial assistance since its creation in 1996. Through 2019 the
36
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fund has invested on average $1.78 billion per year; our WTP estimates are approximately
9 times the size of the fund’s annual budget.
The recently approved infrastructure bill increases the DWSRF budget for the next five
years by $20 billion and adds another $15 billion specifically for the replacement of lead
service line replacement projects,37 equivalent to an additional $7 billion per year. Even
under this increase, our estimated benefits surpass the DWSRF budget by a large margin.
The EPA, however, recognizes that the current levels of investments are not sufficient to
cover the US water infrastructure needs. In its latest assessment of public water system
infrastructure the agency estimated that, for the next 20 years, a $345.1 billion budget is
necessary to rehabilitate, replace, and upgrade existing infrastructure38 . This total translates to an annual cost of $17.2 billion, which is higher but on the same order of magnitude
as our estimated WTP of $15.9 billion.
2.5.1.1. Increases In Water Bills And Comparison To Survey-Based WTP Estimates
In this section we compare our counterfactual willingness-to-pay against estimates in the
existing contingent variation (CV) literature. Under CV methodology, survey participants
are directly asked to provide their own WTP. Chatterjee et al. (2017), for example, asks
survey participants: How much of an increase in your monthly water bill would you be
willing to pay to improve the quality of your water?. These estimates will, therefore, depend
on survey participants’ baseline drinking water quality, and do not specify a target level of
improvement.
The CV literature typically gauges WTP in terms of potential increases in monthly water
bills. Table 2.8 summarizes these studies’ locations and findings. We consider three United
States studies and one study using data from 10 OECD countries.
To compare our estimates to the literature, we translate our calculated aggregate WTP to
increases in households water bills. To do so, we propose a water bill increase which de37
38

Volcovici (2021), EPA (2021)
EPA (2018)
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pends only on households’ willingness-to-pay, not their exposure to water quality violations.
Specifically, the per-person increase in monthly water bills in county c and year y is given
by:

X
WTPc,t
×
Aggregate WTPc′ ,t (vc′ ,t )
c′ WTPc′ ,t × Populationc′ ,t
c′

Monthly Increase in Water Billc,t = P

where, WTPc,t =

β̂ + θ̂ × mc,t
.
α̂
(2.8)

Where Aggregate WTPc,t (vc,t ) is the same as in equation 2.7. In Figure 2.5 we present
these increases in the monthly water bill for a two-person household in 2017. The median
monthly increase is $6.90, with some households paying as much as $19.60 and as little as
$3.20.
Alternatively, we propose a water bill increase which depends only on households’ exposure
to water quality violations over the years in our sample. Specifically, the per person increase
in monthly water bills in county c and year y is given by

PT

Monthly Increase in Water Billc =

t=1 Aggregate

T

WTPc,t (vc,t )

.

(2.9)

In Figure 2.6 we present these monthly water bill increases for a two-person household in
2017. The median increase monthly increase is $3.40, with some households paying as much
as $179.30 and as little as $0.
We find that monthly increases in water bills implied by estimated WTP vary significantly
depending on households’ exposure to poor water quality as well as with household income.
This variation is not captured by the existing contingent valuation literature, in which
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studies typically evaluates WTP in a narrow setting. We additionally demonstrate that
WTP can be significantly higher than the levels suggested by the current literature when
households are exposed to poor drinking water quality and/or are high-income.
2.5.2. Evaluating Annual Public Spending On Water Utilities
In this counterfactual we compare willingness-to-pay for safe drinking water against annual water infrastructure investment costs. We first note that, in the absence of these
investments, water quality will decrease considerably. We therefore consider a scenario in
which drinking water infrastructure degrades to a point at which households are exposed
to extreme violation levels.
Specifically, we consider two cases. First, we consider a case in which all US households are
exposed to the level of violations observed in Flint, MI during the peak of its water crisis.
Second, we consider a case in which all water utilities reach the 95th percentile of violations
observed in the data.
We use Equation 2.7 to compute aggregate WTP for reducing violations from these crisis
scenarios to zero. We find that in these extreme cases, US households’ WTP to restore safe
drinking water access is $160.7 billion per year under a Flint, MI scenario and $159.6 billion
per year under a 95th percentile case, with 95% confidence intervals of [$148.6, $173.6]
billion and [$147.3, $172.2], respectively.
These figures are comparable to total annual public spending on water utilities, which the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates to be $113.03 billion in 2017. This comparison suggests that US households’ value for access to safe drinking water justifies current
spending, and potentially justifies much larger investments in water infrastructure.

2.6.

Conclusion

In this paper we estimate households’ willingness-to-pay for quality drinking water. To
do so we rely on households’ observed avoidance behavior and use violations against EPA
drinking water standards to measure quality at the county-year level. We first show that
households react to violations by increasing their consumption of bottled water. These
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increases are modest and positively related to household income. We build on these findings
to propose and estimate a discrete choice model of drinking water consumption. From the
model we compute a marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for improvements in drinking
water quality, which we find to be increasing in household income. Lastly, we aggregate
out MWTP estimates to the country-year level under two counterfactual scenarios to gauge
whether households’ valuation for water quality is comparable to the cost of maintaining
and improving water infrastructure. We find that aggregate WTP exceeds the historical
DWSRF budget and is comparable to, or potentially much higher than, EPA estimates of
necessary investment to replace, rehabilitate and upgrade existing water infrastructure.
Together our results suggest that current and proposed drinking water infrastructure spending is considerably below households’ willingness-to-pay. This finding holds even under the
recent increase in infrastructure investment passed by the Biden administration. Put plainly,
US households clearly value access to drinking water enough to justify increased spending to
tackle the current drinking water crisis and prevent a further decline drinking water quality.
For reasons previously discussed, we interpret our findings as a likely underestimate of
households’ WTP for drinking water quality. Future research would improve upon our
estimations with more precise data regarding households’ avoidance behavior. Additionally
and importantly, future work can improve upon these estimates using alternative measures
of water quality as well as households’ perception of water quality. This project uses the
best known measure of drinking water quality at the national level, but efforts are improving
to aggregate other measures of quality to the national level. Measuring WTP with a myriad
of household-level measures (utility testing results, household perceptions of quality, etc)
would be an important contribution to this literature.
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Figure 2.1: Maximum Number of New Violations

2.7.

Figures

Figure 2.4: MWTP for a one standard deviation improvement in water quality, by income.
β̂ + θ̂ × Income
Notes: MWTP is given by
× Std. Dev. Violations. Cutoffs are used to classify households
α̂
into bottled or tap water consumers and each provides a different point estimate of β, α, θ.
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Figure 2.2: Bottled Water Purchase Behavior
Figure 2.3: Bottled Water Purchase Behavior - Years to First Violation

Figure 2.5: Monthly increase in water bill for a household of two, by county in 2017
Notes: Monthly water bill increase for a two-person household assuming households pay based only on their
WTP. Per capita increase is given by Equation 2.8.
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Figure 2.6: Monthly increase in water bill for a household of two, by county
Notes: Monthly water bill increase for a two-person household assuming households pay based on their
WTP and exposure to violations. Per-capita increase is given by Monthly Increase in Water Billc =
PT
Aggregate WTPc,t (vc,t )
t=1
.
T
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2.8.

Tables
Table 2.1: Types Of Violations To EPA Drinking Water Standards

Tier 1

First notice

Substances

Example

24 hours

E. coli, nitrate or nitrite, chlo-

Infants drinking water contain-

rine dioxide, turbidity

ing excess nitrate could become
seriously ill and, if untreated,
may die.

Tier 2

30 days

All other MCLs

Presence of coliform bacteria.
Generally not harmful themselves, but could indicate problems with treatment or distribution system.

Tier 3

1 year

Failure to comply with a testing

System failed to collect the cor-

procedure or operation under a

rect number of drinking water

exemption

samples

Table 2.2: Summary Statistics Water Quality Violations

Total Violations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Median

95th p.

Max.

0.23

0.59

0.00

1.13

11.00

Notes: Numbers are based on the total number of new Tier 1 and 2 violations at the county-year weighted
by exposed population.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics Bottled Water and Soda Consumption
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

95th p.

Household Characteristics
Household Income

51565

23260

2500

85000

Household Size

2.484

1.313

1

5

Non White

0.178

0.382

0

1

College Educated

0.504

0.5

0

1

Presence of Children

0.277

0.445

0

1

Bottled Water
$ Spent

48.979

276.528

0

178.20

Gallons Bought

12.937

26.297

0

53.87

# Purchases

4.668

7.343

1

16.00

Price per Gall.

11.92

7.69

1.85

26.05

Soft Drinks
$ Spent

172.45

561.376

0

721.01

Gallons Bought

18.049

35.22

0

75.67

# Purchases

12.685

21.138

1

48.00

Notes: Summary statistics computed using Nielsen’s Homescan and Retail Scanner data from 2006 to 2017.

Table 2.5: Consumption Regressions - Total Ounces Purchased
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

145.92***

155.95***

46.47**

165.23***

50.94***

-

-

-

2.411***

1.572*

242.71***

194.69***

23.16

189.75***

21.52

-

-

-

-1.286

-0.579

Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Total New Violations
Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks
Total New Violations
Income (in 1000s) X Violations

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is ounces of bottled water or ounces of soft drinks.
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Table 2.4: Balance Tests

Panel A
Income
HH Size
Black
Hispanic
< High School
College +
Panel B
Income
HH Size
Black
Hispanic
< High School
College +
Panel C
Income
HH Size
Black
Hispanic
< High School
College +

Mean
No Violations
51.66
2.38
0.18
0.04
0.04
0.30
< 1 Violations
52.13
2.45
0.11
0.06
0.04
0.31
< 5 Violations
51.77
2.46
0.10
0.06
0.04
0.30

Mean
Violations
51.65
2.46
0.10
0.06
0.04
0.30
1+ Violations
50.93
2.48
0.10
0.06
0.04
0.28
5+ Violations
48.28
2.53
0.07
0.04
0.06
0.25

Diff:

Diff:
Year FE

Diff:
Year &
State FE

-0.016
0.088***
-0.081***
0.022***
0.000
0.001

-0.063
0.088***
-0.081***
0.022***
0.000
0.000

-0.024
0.115***
-0.071***
0.010***
0.007**
0.006

-1.206***
0.027***
-0.009***
0.000
0.006***
-0.028***

-1.206***
0.027***
-0.009***
0.000
0.006***
-0.028***

-0.508***
0.032***
-0.009***
0.007***
0.004***
-0.022***

-3.493***
0.072***
-0.034***
-0.022***
0.023***
-0.056***

-3.476***
0.071***
-0.034***
-0.022***
0.023***
-0.056***

-2.655***
0.040*
-0.033***
-0.007**
0.018***
-0.046***

Income is measured in 1000’s. Statistics are calculated over the unweighted Nielsen HMS sample. Violations
are observed at the county-year level, demographics are by household. Differences are measured first using
no fixed effects, then using year FE, then year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: Consumption Regressions - Number of Purchases
Bottled Water
Total New Violations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.23***

0.24***

0.07*

0.26***

0.08**

-

-

-

0.005***

0.002

1.45***

1.19***

0.13

1.15***

0.1

-

-

-

-0.011

-0.009

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks
Total New Violations
Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is number of bottled water or soft drinks purchases.

Table 2.7: Demand Model Results
Cutoff

α

β

θ

10th p. = 1.1 gal

-0.0133***

0.038**

0.0039**

20th p. = 2.2 gal

-0.0136***

0.0589***

0.0028**

30th p. = 3.8 gal

-0.0116***

0.0684***

0.0029**

40th p. = 6.1 gal

-0.0118***

0.0794***

0.0025*

50th p. = 9.2 gal

-0.0124***

0.0928***

0.0024*

60th p. = 13.7 gal

-0.0143***

0.1028***

0.0036**

p-value: ***: < 0.01, **: < 0.05, *: < 0.1
We omit our estimate of µh,y which includes income,
and year and state fixed effects.
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Table 2.8: Literature Estimating WTP in Developed Economies Using Contingent
Variation Methods
Paper

Setting

Survey Year

Average
(Change
Bill)

Jordan and Elnagheeb

Georgia (USA)

1991

$5.49

Whitehead (2006)

Neuse River Basin, NC

1998

$1.75

Beaumais et al. (2014)

10 OECD countries

2008

$5.32

Chatterjee et al. (2017)

Jacksonville, FL

2016

$6.22

(1993)
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APPENDIX
A.1.

Appendix Chapter 1

A.1.1. Data Appendix
A.1.1.1. Water Quality
I access all NWIS and Modern Storet data from 1995 through 2020 using the EPA and
USGS’ joint Water Quality Portal. Legacy Storet data was downloaded in 2018 from
ftp://ftp.epa.gov/storet/exports/.39 From the Legacy Storet and NWIS, I rely on
parameter codes 00010 (temperature), 00300 (dissolved oxygen), 00301 (dissolved oxygen
saturation), 00310 (biochemical oxygen demand), 01049 (lead), 31616 (fecal coliform), 71890
(mercury). From the modern storet data, I rely on characteristics names “temperature",
“dissolved oxygen (DO)", "dissolved oxygen saturation", “biochemical oxygen demand, standard conditions", and “fecal coliform".
For all data sources, I restrict the sample to May through September. For the NWIS and
Modern Storet, I remove any observations which do not conform to the following units:
percent for dissolved oxygen saturation, mg/l for dissolved oxygen and biochemical oxygen
demand, degrees Celsius for temperature, ug/l for lead and mercury, and cfu/100ml for
fecal coliforms. I winsorize the top and bottom 1% of observations by parameter. Following
Keiser and Shapiro (2018), I calculate DO saturation by matching dissolved oxygen and
temperature at the station-hour level, but this calculation is superseded by pre-calculated
DO saturation where available.
Most stations’ geographic coordinate systems are listed as NAD27, NAD83, WGS84, or unknown; I remove observations with any other system listed or with no value reported. Based
on conversations with other researchers, I classify all Legacy Storet stations as WGS84. I
convert all stations to NAD83 in ArcGIS for compatibility with the NHD geospatial data,
and assume all unknown stations to be in NAD83. In an informal analysis, I find little
39

The EPA has reorganized its legacy water quality data storage since then, and this link is no longer active.
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difference between the coordinate systems used.
A.1.1.2. Stream Trace
For all calculations concerning river networks, I rely on the USGS National Hydrography
Dataset (NHD). In order to match the location of water quality samples to upstream status
(e.g. in-state headwater, out-of-state), I complete the following steps. First, I identify
stream segments associated with each relevant characteristics. I match water quality sample
stations to NHD river segments using ArcGIS’ “near" tool. For the remaining steps, define
S0 as the river segment on which a sample station is located. I separately identify all NHD
river segments which intersect a state border. I identify border rivers manually using river
name and a visual match in ArcGIS. Finally, the NHD denotes whether each segment is a
headwater (i.e. no upstream segment exists) and, if not, the segment identifier for the main
upstream path.
I then identify whether S0 is a headwater, border crossing, or border river from the characteristic information collected above. If S0 is any of these types, I stop the search immediately. If not, I identify whether upstream main path S1 is any of these types. If so, the
search ends; if not, it continues to S2 , the main path segment upstream of S1 . This iteration
continues until a headwater, border crossing, or border river is identified, or up to 1,100
upstream segments. I then restrict the sample to segments of stream order 4 or greater as
discussed in the main text. Appendix Figure A.1.2 provides a visual representation of the
upstream trace for seven segments in the Southeast: four of these segments trace upstream
to an in-state headwater, while the other three trace to a state border.
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A.2.

Appendix Chapter 1: Figures
Figure A.1.1: Water Quality: Years to Upstream Authorization (Weighted)

Includes stream segment and calendar year fixed effects, segments are weighted by test sample count.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Sample is restricted to segments downstream of state
border, of stream order 4 or greater and at least 800 meters from a state border, which were exposed to
upstream authorization in 1977 or later. Segments are weighted by water quality sample observations.
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Figure A.1.2: River System Trace Example

A.3.

Appendix Chapter 1: Tables
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Table A.1.1: Stream Level Sensitivity Analysis

Main Specification
Stream Level 3+
Stream Level 2+
All Stream Levels
Controls
Authorization X Controls

General

Controls

-0.0931∗∗∗
-0.0638∗
-0.0599
-0.0602

-0.0974∗∗∗
-0.0709∗
-0.0668∗
-0.0672∗
X

Authorization
X Controls
-0.0933∗∗
-0.0801
-0.0707
-0.0722
X
X

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments 800 meters or more from a state border, downstream of another
state, 1977-2020. Each row reports the coefficient on upstream authorization using the same regression
structure, but expanding the sample incrementally to include smaller streams, defined using the USGS NHD
variable "stream order." * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A.1.2: Sample Period Sensitivity Analysis

Own-state authorization

Upstream authorization
Obs
R-Squared

1977 - 2020
0.0148
(0.0324)

1972 - 2020
0.0139
(0.0270)

1960 - 2020
0.0321
(0.0276)

-0.0931∗∗∗
(0.0332)
40915
0.607

-0.0492
(0.0331)
46478
0.588

-0.0480∗
(0.0266)
50633
0.586

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, downstream of another state. Each column reports the main results using an identical regression
over varying time periods. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.1.3: Border Segments Sensitivity Analysis

Own-state authorization

Upstream authorization
Controls
Authorization X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

(1)
0.0131
(0.0308)

(2)
0.00982
(0.0321)

(3)
0.0165
(0.0319)

-0.0751∗∗
(0.0357)

-0.0794∗∗
(0.0365)
X

42434
0.608

42434
0.608

-0.0761
(0.0464)
X
X
42434
0.608

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, downstream of another state,
1977-2020. in contrast to the main analysis, this analysis includes river segments within 800 meters of the
border. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A.1.4: Instate Rivers Sensitivity Analysis

Own-state authorization

Upstream authorization
Obs
R-Squared

Main Spec.
0.0148
(0.0324)

Incl. Intrastate
-0.00279
(0.0290)

-0.0931∗∗∗
(0.0332)
40915
0.607

-0.101∗∗
(0.0431)
207975
0.647

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.1.5: Upstream Authorization Effects: Weighted Segments

Own-state authorization
Upstream authorization

(1)
0.0331
(0.0604)
-0.194∗∗∗
(0.0579)

Upstream LCV Score
Income
Upstream Democrat Governor
Upstream GDP Pct Agriculture
Upstream GDP Pct Manufacturing

(2)
0.0294
(0.0586)
-0.176∗∗
(0.0674)
0.0515
(0.0388)
-0.123∗
(0.0702)
0.0263
(0.0224)
0.00259
(0.0241)
-0.116
(0.0768)

Upstream (Auth. X Ln(LCV))
Upstream (Auth. X Ln(Income))
Upstream (Auth. X Democrat)
Upstream (Auth. X Agriculture)
Upstream (Auth. X Manufacturing)
Controls
Authorization X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

X
40915
0.849

40915
0.850

(3)
0.0295
(0.0590)
-0.163∗∗
(0.0661)
-0.0195
(0.0272)
-0.0571
(0.0594)
0.130∗∗∗
(0.0400)
0.00269
(0.0326)
-0.0933∗∗
(0.0434)
0.0746∗
(0.0402)
-0.0930∗∗
(0.0405)
-0.110∗∗∗
(0.0360)
0.00186
(0.0251)
-0.0333
(0.0732)
X
X
40915
0.850

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year tuple. Segments are weighted
by number of test samples. Stream segment and year fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard
errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the
governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are
converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the state-year level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream
order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state border, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

84

Table A.1.6: Sample Size by Metric
Test Samples

Segment-Years

16,777
17,343
17,714
321,018
380,754
401,322
1,251,576

1,267
1,453
512
11,747
15,931
11,069
42,876

Mercury
Lead
Phosphates
Biochemical Oxygen Demand
Fecal Coliforms
Nitrates
Dissolved Oxygen Saturation Percent

Table A.1.7: Effect of Own-State Authorization on Water Quality - Other Metrics
(1)

(2)

(3)

Own-State Authorization
Biochemical Oxygen Demand
Fecal Coliforms

-0.0120
-0.0772

-0.0305
-0.0853

-0.0315
-0.0831

Lead
Mercury

0.151
0.504∗∗∗

0.124
0.480∗∗∗

0.0392
0.539∗∗∗

Nitrates
Phosphates
Upstream State Authorization
Biochemical Oxygen Demand
Fecal Coliforms

-0.0722
0.0300

-0.0685
0.0222

-0.0706
0.0235

0.0849
-0.0739

0.0778
-0.0796

0.384
0.0363

Lead
Mercury

0.559∗∗∗
0.0787

0.566∗∗∗
0.0511

0.735∗∗∗
-0.224∗

-0.0374
-0.000192

-0.0295
-0.00843
X

-0.0654
-0.0443
X
X

Nitrates
Phosphates
Controls
Authorization X Controls

Pollutant values are observed at the segment-year, converted to zscores and negated: positive coefficients
correspond to higher water quality. Stream segment and year fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include income, LCV Score, an indicator
for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous
controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the state-year level. Sample is restricted to segments
of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state border, downstream of another state, 1977-2020.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.1.8: Interstate Compact Effects on Water Quality - Other Metrics

Biochemical Oxygen Demand
Fecal Coliforms
Lead
Nitrates
Phosphates
Controls

Great Lakes
0.0371
0.0197
0.127
0.118
∗
-0.174
-0.189

Chespeake Bay Watershed
0.00456
0.0579
-0.0483∗∗
-0.0568∗
0
0

-0.0652
-0.0279∗

0.0772∗∗
0.0246∗∗∗

-0.0672
-0.0368
X

0.0756∗∗
0.0250∗∗∗
X

Pollutant values are observed at the segment-year, converted to zscores and negated: positive coefficients
correspond to higher water quality. Stream segment and year fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include income, LCV Score, an indicator
for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous
controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the state-year level. Sample is restricted to segments
of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state border, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.

Table A.1.9: Effect of Upstream Authorization on Water Quality
(1)
-0.0389
(0.0368)

Own-state authorization

Upstream authorization

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.136
(0.119)

Auth. X LT 10 miles upstream of border

-0.206
(0.166)

Upstr. Auth. X LT 10 miles downstr. of border
Large Streams
Obs
R-Squared

-0.159
(0.126)
208294
0.217

40915
0.196

40915
0.196

40915
0.196

Observations are totaled to the segment-year level and converted to zscores. Stream segment and year fixed
effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Sample is restricted
to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state border, downstream of another
state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.3.0.1. Main Regression Results, All Interaction Variables Included
Table B1: Interstate Compact Effects on Water Quality

Own-state authorization

GLB Watershed X Compact Year

Great Lakes Compact
-0.00464
-0.00557
(0.0285)
(0.0311)
0.104∗∗
(0.0476)

Chesapeake Bay
Agreement
-0.00993
-0.00999
(0.0285)
(0.0311)

0.0957∗
(0.0491)

CBWA Watershed X Compact Year

-0.197
(0.142)

-0.196
(0.140)

LCV score

-0.00424
(0.00806)

-0.00323
(0.00825)

Income

-0.0290
(0.0349)

-0.0291
(0.0334)

Democrat Governor

0.00735
(0.0106)

0.00830
(0.0114)

GDP Pct Agriculture

0.0201
(0.0124)

0.0194
(0.0120)

GDP Pct Manufacturing

-0.00527
(0.0113)
X
207975
0.647

-0.00918
(0.0110)
X
207975
0.648

Controls
Obs
R-Squared

207975
0.647

207975
0.648

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B2: State Authorization Effects on Border River Water Quality

Either State Authorized
Both States Authorized

(1)
0.00564
(0.0604)
-0.0102
(0.0427)

LCV score
Income
Democrat Governor
GDP Pct Agriculture
GDP Pct Manufacturing

(2)
0.0260
(0.0629)
-0.0211
(0.0344)
-0.0209
(0.0239)
0.00141
(0.0641)
-0.00670
(0.0236)
-0.0258
(0.0309)
-0.179∗∗
(0.0673)

Either Auth. X Mean Income
Either Auth. X Mean LCV
Either Auth. X Dem. Gov
Either Auth. X Manufacturing GDP Pct
Either Auth. X Agriculture GDP Pct

(3)
-0.0568
(0.102)
-0.0185
(0.0348)
-0.0646
(0.0789)
0.0310
(0.121)
-0.0554∗∗
(0.0234)
-0.0307
(0.0813)
-0.0684
(0.0950)
-0.0235
(0.0856)
0.0464
(0.0707)
0.0532
(0.0333)
-0.117
(0.0807)
0.00313
(0.0789)

Both Auth. X Mean Income
Both Auth. X Mean LCV
Both Auth. X Dem. Gov
Both Auth. X Manufacturing GDP Pct
Both Auth. X Agriculture GDP Pct
Controls
Either Auth. X Controls
Both Auth. X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

8471
0.528

88

X

X
X

8471
0.534

8471
0.534

(4)
0.0435
(0.0548)
-0.0276
(0.0436)
-0.0300
(0.0319)
-0.0968
(0.0840)
-0.0709
(0.0504)
-0.0240
(0.0390)
-0.169∗∗
(0.0739)

0.0996∗
(0.0528)
0.0143
(0.0273)
0.0766
(0.0571)
0.00733
(0.0679)
-0.00119
(0.0240)
X
X
8471
0.535

Table B3: Upstream Authorization Effects Near Borders (10 Miles) - All Controls

Own-state authorization
Upstream authorization
Upstr. Auth. X LT 10 Miles Downstr. of Border

(1)
0.0177
(0.0322)
-0.124∗∗∗
(0.0314)
0.230∗∗∗
(0.0642)

Upstream LCV Score
Upstream Income
Upstream Democrat Governor
Upstream GDP Pct Agriculture
Upstream GDP Pct Manufacturing

(2)
0.0142
(0.0336)
-0.128∗∗∗
(0.0329)
0.227∗∗∗
(0.0664)
-0.00576
(0.00938)
-0.0415
(0.0445)
-0.00987
(0.0174)
0.00368
(0.0111)
-0.0175
(0.0267)

Upstream (Auth. X Ln(LCV))
Upstream (Auth. X Ln(Income))
Upstream (Auth. X Democrat)
Upstream (Auth. X Agriculture)
Upstream (Auth. X Manufacturing)
Upstream Controls
Upstream Auth. X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

X
40915
0.607

40915
0.608

(3)
0.0213
(0.0332)
-0.125∗∗∗
(0.0430)
0.240∗∗∗
(0.0799)
-0.00344
(0.0231)
0.00551
(0.0404)
0.0412
(0.0256)
-0.00178
(0.0257)
-0.0677∗∗
(0.0278)
-0.00518
(0.0254)
-0.0629∗∗
(0.0277)
-0.0584∗∗
(0.0267)
0.00505
(0.0224)
0.0658∗
(0.0390)
X
X
40915
0.608

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, on an interstate river, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B4: Upstream Authorization Effects Near Borders (20 Miles) - All Controls

Own-state authorization
Upstream authorization
Upstr. Auth. X LT 20 Miles Downstr. of Border

(1)
0.0186
(0.0324)
-0.137∗∗∗
(0.0245)
0.192∗∗∗
(0.0654)

Upstream LCV Score
Upstream Income
Upstream Democrat Governor
Upstream GDP Pct Agriculture
Upstream GDP Pct Manufacturing

(2)
0.0151
(0.0338)
-0.140∗∗∗
(0.0269)
0.187∗∗∗
(0.0660)
-0.00571
(0.00939)
-0.0413
(0.0445)
-0.00981
(0.0174)
0.00363
(0.0111)
-0.0167
(0.0267)

Upstream (Auth. X Ln(LCV))
Upstream (Auth. X Ln(Income))
Upstream (Auth. X Democrat)
Upstream (Auth. X Agriculture)
Upstream (Auth. X Manufacturing)
Upstream Controls
Upstream Auth. X Controls
Obs
R-Squared

X
40915
0.607

40915
0.608

(3)
0.0219
(0.0335)
-0.138∗∗∗
(0.0391)
0.194∗∗∗
(0.0708)
-0.00215
(0.0227)
0.00505
(0.0404)
0.0417
(0.0254)
-0.00340
(0.0257)
-0.0652∗∗
(0.0277)
-0.00659
(0.0249)
-0.0621∗∗
(0.0276)
-0.0589∗∗
(0.0266)
0.00674
(0.0221)
0.0632
(0.0391)
X
X
40915
0.608

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, on an interstate river, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B5: Political Party Impact on Water Quality
(1)
-0.0769
(0.0503)

(2)
-0.0810∗
(0.0450)

Same Party

0.0214
(0.0461)

0.0184
(0.0448)

Same Party X Upstream Auth.

-0.0191
(0.0490)

-0.0160
(0.0473)

Upstream authorization

LCV score

0.00349
(0.0147)

Income

-0.0511
(0.0644)

Democrat Governor

0.00133
(0.0213)

GDP Pct Agriculture

0.0188
(0.0176)

GDP Pct Manufacturing

-0.0205
(0.0171)
X
40915
0.607

Controls
Obs
R-Squared

40915
0.607

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year
fixed effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls
include income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent
agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are converted to z-scores. All controls vary at the stateyear level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 800 meters or more from a state
border, downstream of another state, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B6: Political Party Impact on Border River Water Quality
(1)
0.0229
(0.0610)

(2)
0.0478
(0.0659)

Both States Authorized

0.0217
(0.0443)

0.00392
(0.0404)

Same Party

0.111∗∗∗
(0.0367)

0.0999∗∗
(0.0385)

Same Party X Both Authorized

-0.0699
(0.0439)

-0.0498
(0.0463)

Either State Authorized

LCV score

-0.0167
(0.0242)

Income

0.00816
(0.0653)

Democrat Governor

0.0276
(0.0212)

GDP Pct Agriculture

-0.0314
(0.0309)

GDP Pct Manufacturing

-0.172∗∗
(0.0664)
X
8471
0.536

Controls
Obs
R-Squared

8471
0.530

Water quality index is measured in z-scores, observed at the segment-year. Stream segment and year fixed
effects are included for all regressions, standard errors are clustered by border state pairs. Controls include
income, LCV Score, an indicator for whether the governor is a Democrat, and state GDP percent agriculture/manufacturing. All continuous controls are calculate as the mean across both states and converted to
z-scores. Governorship is defined as Democratic if either governor is a Democrat. All controls vary at the
state-pair-year level. Sample is restricted to segments of stream order 4 or higher, 1977-2020. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.4.

Appendix Chapter 2

A.5.

Data Processing

A.5.1. SDWIS Data
SDWIS violation reports are accessed state-by-state from EPA SDWIS, restricting to active
status community water systems (CWS). The data includes many violations which appear
to be duplicate reports of the same violation; we identify unique violations using utility
ID, violation type (tier and contaminant name), and compliance period start date. We
consolidate any violations which are duplicates across these parameters. We exclude Tier
3 (non-health-based) violations from the analysis.
The EPA provides a mapping of utilities to county/counties served; because this is the most
granular geographic information available at the national level, we aggregate violations to
the county level in order to be matched to the HMS/RMS Nielsen data. Utilities vary in size
by orders of magnitude, necessitating a weighting scheme based on population served. We
experience three primary measurement issues in assigning population weights. First, some
utilities span portions of multiple counties, and we observe only the total customer base
rather than the customer base in each county. Second, while we observe population and
county/counties served for all utilities in the violations data, we do not observe population
served for utilities with zero violations. For this reason, we cannot assume that the sum
total of customers served by utilities in our data is proportionate to the county’s total
customer base. Third, utilities may include transient customers in their customer base; we
observe, for example, that utilities serving areas with beach amenities or amusement parks
report customer bases which far exceed the county’s total population.
Given these limitations, we make several necessary assumptions. First, for utilities which
span multiple counties, we assign weights based on the counties’ relative total population.
If Utility U serves 300 customers across counties A and B, wherein county A has twice the
population of county B, we assign 200 customers to county A and 100 to county B. Second,
to address unobserved customer counts among utilities with no violations, we rely on 2019
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Census population figures to assign county population values. If we observe 1 violation
for a customer count of 300 people in a county with population 1,000, then the weighted
violation total is 0.3 violations. Third, if the total customer count exceeds the Census
population total, we scale each utility’s weight (using county-specific customer total) so
that the sum total of customer count is equal to the Census population total. For example,
if the customer count across all utilities (which ever experience a violation) in a county is
200% the county’s Census population count, then each violation utility’s weight is scaled
by 0.5. This step may overestimate total violations in a county if, for example, a utility
serving half the population experienced zero violations (and is therefore unobserved in the
customer count total), while the utility reporting a violation has a high customer count
because it provides services to tourist facilities.
A.5.2. NHANES
We use publicly available NHANES dietary and demographic data; specifically, we focus on
survey participants’ total plain drinking water consumption, as well as total bottled versus
tap water consumption. For participants who report water consumption on both Day 1
and Day 2 of the survey, we take the average across both days. NHANES reports income
in brackets: we assign households the midpoint of the bracket reported. For households
top-coded at income of $75,000 or more, we assign a value of $85,000 for consistency with
the Nielsen data. We use standard survey weights as directed in NHANES supplementary
materials to estimate predictive demographic coefficients:

Wi,t = α + νXi,t + ρt + ϵi,t

(A.1)

Where Wi,t represents water consumption (total, bottled, or tap) in ounces by respondent i
in year t. Xi,t is a vector of demographic characteristics: household income, household size,
and indicator variables for Hispanic, Black, less than high school education, and college
education or more. ρt captures year fixed effects from 2003 through 2017 (NHANES is
conducted on a two-year cycle: we assign the earlier year for each survey). Table A.2.1
94

presents the predictive coefficients.
Next, we apply these coefficients to county-level demographics. We rely on American Community Survey (ACS) year-level county demographic from 2010 through 2017:

Ŵc,t = α̂ + ν̂Xc,t + ρ̂t

(A.2)

Wherein Ŵc,t is used in the demand model analysis to estimate average per-person daily
water consumption in county c in year t.
A.5.3. Homescan Data
Our final sample consists of all purchases made in the bottled water and soft drinks and
carbonated beverages categories, by Homescan panelists in the period of 2004 to 2017.
To compute household income we use the income brackets in the raw data and for each
household-year observation we set the income equal to the mid-point of the observed bracket.
A.5.4. Retail Scanner Data
We use the Retail Scanner Data to compute a county-year level price measure for gallons of
bottled water. Our final sample covers the period of 2006 to 2017. To compute our measure
we use the following equation

PSc,t

Price per gallonc,t = PSc,t
s

Bottled Water Revenues,t
Bottled Water Sales (in gallons)s,t
s

where, {1, ..., Sc,t } are all stores in county c in year t.

A.6.

Evidence of Avoidance Behavior

In this section we further explore the relationship between water quality and consumption
of bottled water and soft drinks.
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A.6.1. Lagged Violations
We consider the following model:

yh,c,t = α+βViolationsc,t +γViolationsc,t−1 +θIncomeh,t ×Violationsc,t +νXh,t +ρt +µc +ϵh,t

Where yh,c,t represents consumption of the relevant product (bottled water, soft drinks)
by household h in county c in year t. Consumption is measured separately using each of
total ounces purchased and number of purchases. Violationsc,t is the total number of new
violations in county c and year t, Incomeh,t is the mean-centered annual income of household
h in year t. Xh,t is a vector of household characteristics, ρt and µc are year and county
fixed effects respectively.
The results suggest that lagged violations increase consumption, even while controlling for
current violations. However, in our preferred specifications in column 5 the effect is not
precisely estimated.
A.6.2. Reduced Form Regressions Including Education and Race
We consider the following model:

yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t
+ γEducationh,t × Violationsc,t
+ ξNon-Whiteh,t × Violationsc,t
+ νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t

Where yh,c,t represents consumption of bottled water by household h in county c in year
t. Consumption is measured separately using each of total ounces purchased and number
of purchases. Violationsc,t is the total number of new violations in county c and year
t, Incomeh,t is the mean-centered annual income of household h in year t, Educationh,t
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is the highest level of education achieved by the household head (no high-school, high
school, college, post-graduate education) and Non-Whiteh,t is a dummy that indicates if
the household head is non-white. Xh,t is a vector of household characteristics, ρt and µc
are year and county fixed effects respectively.
In our preferred specifications in column 5 we see that the interaction of the non-white
dummy variable with violations has a non-significant and small effect on consumption of
bottled water. We also see that the interaction of education with violations has a negative
effect on consumption of bottled water, however, this effect is not precisely estimated.
Finally, the effect of the interaction of income with violations is similar in magnitude to the
one presented in Section 2.3 and is statistically significant.

A.7.

Appendix Chapter 2: Tables
Table A.2.2: Consumption Regressions - Total Ounces Purchased
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total New Violations

54.43***

57.02***

18.56

60.27***

20

Total New Violations (t-1)

23.52***

27***

5.16

27.87***

5.27

-

-

-

1.033***

0.56

Total New Violations

61.73***

47.2***

-3.68

46.7***

-3.17

Total New Violations (t-1)

47.43***

32.58***

-17.33

32.44***

-17.29

-

-

-

-0.159***

0.198

HH Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks

Income (in 1000s) X Violations

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is ounces of bottled water or ounces of soft drinks.
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Table A.2.1: Demographic Predictors of Drinking Water Consumption

Hispanic
Black
Less than High School
College +
Total household size
Income
Survey year=2005
Survey year=2007
Survey year=2009
Survey year=2011
Survey year=2013
Survey year=2015
Survey year=2017
Constant
Obs
R-Squared

Plain
0.987∗
(0.566)
-2.903∗∗∗
(0.620)
-2.402∗∗∗
(0.503)
2.477∗∗∗
(0.555)
-1.922∗∗∗
(0.125)
2.695∗∗∗
(0.268)
-4.538∗∗∗
(1.710)
-5.960∗∗∗
(1.511)
-5.651∗∗∗
(1.469)
-1.365
(1.680)
-0.347
(1.669)
3.052∗
(1.714)
3.033∗
(1.688)
30.34∗∗∗
(1.778)
67498
0.0301

Tap
-6.046∗∗∗
(0.537)
-7.470∗∗∗
(0.584)
-1.683∗∗∗
(0.509)
5.170∗∗∗
(0.529)
-1.456∗∗∗
(0.125)
0.997∗∗∗
(0.254)
-4.863∗∗∗
(1.563)
-6.070∗∗∗
(1.414)
-6.519∗∗∗
(1.368)
-2.328
(1.443)
-2.323
(1.782)
-0.478
(1.600)
-3.650∗∗
(1.494)
24.71∗∗∗
(1.497)
67501
0.0434

Bottled
7.033∗∗∗
(0.541)
4.565∗∗∗
(0.441)
-0.719∗
(0.400)
-2.692∗∗∗
(0.401)
-0.466∗∗∗
(0.0915)
1.696∗∗∗
(0.208)
0.335
(0.740)
0.120
(0.938)
0.878
(0.999)
0.974
(1.024)
1.987∗∗
(0.985)
3.541∗∗∗
(0.973)
6.693∗∗∗
(1.308)
5.617∗∗∗
(0.981)
67503
0.0239

Income is measured in Ln(1000’s) here for clarity; county level estimates rely on coefficient of raw
estimated income. NHANES survey weights are applied. Plain water is inclusive of both tap and bottled
water; all water types include both at-home and away-from-home consumption. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A.2.3: Consumption Regressions - Number of Purchases
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total New Violations

0.17***

0.18***

0.04

0.2***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.12***

0.13***

0.07

0.14***

0.07

-

-

-

0.005***

0.002

Total New Violations

0.86***

0.71***

0.06

0.69***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.68***

0.51***

-0.14

0.5***

-0.14

-

-

-

-0.007***

-0.007

Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks

Income (in 1000s) X Violations

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is number of bottled water or soft drinks purchases.

Table A.2.4: Consumption Regressions - Number of Purchases
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total New Violations

0.17***

0.18***

0.04

0.2***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.12***

0.13***

0.07

0.14***

0.07

-

-

-

0.005***

0.002

Total New Violations

0.86***

0.71***

0.06

0.69***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.68***

0.51***

-0.14

0.5***

-0.14

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks

Income (in 1000s) X Violations

-

-

-

-0.007***

-0.007

Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is number of bottled water or soft drinks purchases.

99

Table A.2.5: Consumption Regressions - Number of Purchases
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total New Violations

0.17***

0.18***

0.04

0.2***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.12***

0.13***

0.07

0.14***

0.07

-

-

-

0.005***

0.002

Total New Violations

0.86***

0.71***

0.06

0.69***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.68***

0.51***

-0.14

0.5***

-0.14

-

-

-

-0.007***

-0.007

Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks

Income (in 1000s) X Violations

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is number of bottled water or soft drinks purchases.
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